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NOT FOR JUST ANOTHER PRETTY FACE:
PROVIDING FULL PROTECTION UNDER
THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
JAMES M. LEFT*
I. INTRODUCTION
On a daily basis, we are so bombarded with advertising that it
is virtually impossible to ignore the extent to which celebrities ex-
ploit their identities for commercial gain." Celebrities promote
every type of product, from beer2 to shampoo3 to automobiles.4
These individuals can generate a great amount of revenue through
endorsements,6 and the potential rewards for the owners of the
promoted products are even greater. There are occasions, however,
* B.B.A., 1988, Pacific Lutheran University; J.D., 1994, Pepperdine University. Mr.
Left is currently an attorney-advisor with the U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Office
for Immigration Review in Oakdale, Louisiana.
1. State ex rel. Elvis Presley Int'l Memorial Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 94
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).
2. See, e.g., Christine Ziaya, Outtakes: Elvira vs. Vampira: Tale From the Crypt, L.A.
TimEs, Oct. 25, 1987, Calendar Section at 19 (Cassandra Peterson portraying Elvira to pro-
mote Coors).
3. See, e.g., To the Loser, the Spoils, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 5, 1992, at 79 (Olympic runner
Suzy Hamilton endorsing Pert Plus shampoo).
4. See, e.g., Andrea Heiman, Beyond Thinking Pink, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 1992, at El
(Lindsay Wagner promoting Ford automobiles).
5. A well-known individual, especially a popular athlete, can earn millions of dollars
from endorsements. For instance, even though Michael Jordan has retired from basketball,
he still earns about $28 million per year from Nike, McDonald's, Gatorade, and other com-
panies. David Greising et al., The NBA May Feel a Void - But Jordan Inc. Will Play On,
Bus. WK., Oct. 18, 1993; at 38. Other top "sports endorsers" include senior golf pro Arnold
Palmer, who earns an estimated $11 million per year endorsing Cadillac, Textron, and
Pennzoil, and pro football quarterback Joe Montana, who earns an estimated $9 million per
year endorsing Sara Lee, Upper Deck collector cards, and Sega video games. Id.
6. Two examples of this phenomenon occurred in connection with Pepsi's and Sprint's
advertising campaigns. Over the past several years, Pepsi has recruited many celebrities to
endorse its products. Bruce Horovitz, Wishing on a Star, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 7, 1993, at D1,
D7. The most notable example was Pepsi sponsoring three Michael Jackson concert tours.
Id. During that time frame, Pepsi's market share increased by two points, which translates
into an estimated additional $500 million in annual sales. Id. Also, Sprint executives credit
their spokesperson, Candice Bergen, for a 2% increase in market share in the telecommuni-
cations industry. Id.
The effect of "star power" upon a given industry is not an entirely new occurrence.
During one scene in the 1934 film IT HAPPENED ONE NIGHT, Clark Gable took off his shirt
and he did not have on a T-shirt underneath. David Wharton, The Boxer Rebellion, L.A.
TiMEs, May 28, 1993, at El. Consequently, undershirt sales took a dramatic turn for the
1
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in which a company will attempt to invoke a celebrity's persona
without compensating the individual in question. Courts look upon
this type of action unfavorably because, as one court noted, "It is
unfair that one should be permitted to commercialize or exploit or
capitalize upon another's name, reputation or accomplishments
merely because the owner's accomplishments have been highly
publicized."'7 Thus, the courts employ the right of publicity8 to
protect a celebrity's right to exploit his identity.' In fact, the
courts recognize the right regardless of whether the celebrity
achieved fame because of "rare ability, dumb luck or a combina-
tion thereof."'10
There is no consensus, however, regarding the scope of the
right of publicity. Many jurisdictions protect only a person's name,
likeness, or actual image," while a few jurisdictions extend protec-
worse. Id.
7. McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 922 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Palmer v. Schonhorn
Enter., Inc., 232 A.2d 458, 462 (N.J. Super. 1967)).
8. The right of publicity arises exclusively under state law. Zacchini v. Scripps-How-
ard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 566-68 (1977). The California Supreme Court defines
the right as "the reaction of the public to name and likeness, which may be fortuitous or
which may be managed or planned, [and] endows the name and likeness of the person in-
volved with commercially exploitable opportunities." Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d
425, 431 (Cal. 1979); see also Brewer v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 749 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir.
1984).
Other jurisdictions define the right of publicity "as a celebrity's right to exclusive use of
his or her name and likeness." Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v.
American Heritage Prods., Inc., 694 F.2d 674, 676 (11th Cir. 1983). Accord Estate of Presley
v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1353 (D.N.J. 1981); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F.
Supp. 836, 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
However, someone who is not a well-known celebrity may also invoke the right. J.
Thomas McCarthy, Melville B. Nimmer and the Right of Publicity: A Tribute, 34 UCLA L.
REv. 1703, 1710 (1987); see also Hooker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 551 F. Supp.
1060, 1062-63 (N.D. Il. 1982) (professional woodcarver); Staruski v. Continental Tel. Co. of
Vt., 581 A.2d 266, 266 (Vt. 1990) (telephone operator); Winston v. National Broadcasting
Co., 282 Cal. Rptr. 498, 499 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (game show contestant).
9. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977);
Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983); Mot-
schenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 825 (9th Cir. 1974); Uhlaender v.
Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1970). But see Stephano v. News Group
Publications, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 584 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that a separate common law
right does not exist in New York; a cause of action can only be brought under statutory
law).
10. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
11. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1992) (providing protection
for only a person's name, portrait, and picture); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1103 (1992) (pro-
tecting the right of publicity in a person's name, photograph, and likeness); Lavery v. Auto-
mation Management Consultants, Inc., 360 S.E.2d 336, 342 (Va. 1987) (recognizing a right of
publicity in an individual's name and likeness); Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr.
342, 347 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (protecting against appropriation of a person's name and
[Vol. 11:321
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RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
tion to a person's identity in general. 12 Although most jurisdictions
hold that the right of publicity is a property right, 3 they all do not
allow the right to survive death.1
4
The purpose of this Comment is to redefine the right of pub-
licity. Courts should view the right as a property right that pro-
tects a celebrity's identity and not merely certain characteristics.
Furthermore, because the right of publicity is an intellectual prop-
erty right, it should survive the celebrity's death regardless of
whether the person exploited the right during his lifetime.
This Comment emphasizes California case law, both state and
federal, because a large bulk of the law concerning the right of
publicity comes out of this state.'" Statutory and case law from
New York and other jurisdictions, however, are discussed where
appropriate.
Part II examines the traditional approach to the right of pub-
licity adopted by the California courts, otherwise known as misap-
propriation. The California courts viewed misappropriation as a
form of invasion of privacy that was actionable only when a de-
fendant appropriated a person's actual name or likeness."
Part III discusses the modern approach to the right of public-
ity. Several courts find a violation of the right when a defendant
likeness).
12. See McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 922 (3d Cir. 1994); Midler v. Ford Motor
Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1513 (1992); Carson, 698 F.2d
at 835; Uhlaender, 316 F. Supp. at 1282; Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d
129, 137 (Wis. 1979).
13. See infra notes 241-45 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Reeves v. United Artists, 765 F.2d 79, 80 (6th Cir. 1985); Maritote v.
Desilu Prods., Inc., 345 F.2d 418, 420 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 883 (1965);
Heinz v. Frank Lloyd Wright Found., 229 U.S.P.Q. 201 (W.D. Wis. 1986); James v. Delilah
Films, Inc., 544 N.Y.S.2d 447, 451 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
15. Judge Kozinski observed that millions of celebrities live within the Ninth Circuit's
jurisdiction (California), and therefore, the Ninth Circuit is the Court of Appeals for "the
Hollywood Circuit." White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1521 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993). Judge Kozinski argued that
federal courts have a greater concern over the right of publicity than state courts because
state courts are not concerned with preemption. Id. at 1518 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Also,
the Supreme Court is unlikely to consider the right because it views the right as a matter of
state law. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting); see also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Co., 433 U.S. 562, 566-68 (1977). Therefore, Judge Kozinski concluded that the Ninth Cir-
cuit has the final say on the right of publicity. White, 989 F.2d at 1518 (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
This Comment also discusses Ninth Circuit decisions in detail because its decisions re-
present "the cutting edge" of right of publicity law. See Felix H. Kent, California Court
Expands Celebrities' Rights, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 30, 1992, Advertising Law, at 3 (concluding that
the Ninth Circuit expands the right beyond the borderlines established by any other court).
16. See infra notes 29-77 and accompanying text.
1994]
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unlawfully appropriates anything associated with a person's iden-
tity." The courts should examine the totality of the alleged appro-
priation to determine whether the public would likely believe that
a celebrity is promoting the defendant's product.18 The courts
should also consider the defendant's state of mind 9 and should
hold a defendant liable if the defendant knew or should have
known that his actions created the appearance of a celebrity
endorsement.20
Part IV discusses appropriation of a character portrayed by an
actor. In these instances, the right of publicity exists only when the
character is so closely associated with the individual that the pub-
lic views the character as part of the person's actual identity.2'
Part V examines the nature of the right of publicity. The
traditional approach, as outlined in California case law, considered
the right to be a personal one which was neither assignable nor
descendible.22 Most modern courts agree that the right of publicity
is a property right that is freely transferable during a celebrity's
lifetime.23 Disagreement exists, however, as to whether the right
survives a person's death.24 Because the right of publicity is a valid
intellectual property right, the right should survive death regard-
less of whether the individual exercised the right during his life.2 5
Finally, Part VI discusses defenses to the right of publicity.
First Amendment issues of free expression and parody limit the
scope of the right of publicity.26 The courts will not allow the First
Amendment to immunize a media defendant, however, when the
media directly appropriates a celebrity's identity for its own com-
mercial gain. 7 Also, the parody defense will not protect a work
that is so similar to the celebrity's performance that the work is
only an imitation and not a true parody. 28
II. HISTORICAL VIEW OF MISAPPROPRIATION
Misappropriation developed from the tort of invasion of pri-
17. See infra notes 86-158 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 165-77 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 179-97 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 179-97 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 198-228 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 235-37, 260-62 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 241-45 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 251-321 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 322-46 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 347-419 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 365-98 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 399-419 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 11:321
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vacy. Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis first proposed this tort
in 1890,0 asserting that increased abuses by the press required a
remedy upon "a distinct ground essential to the protection of pri-
vate individuals against outrageous and unjustifiable infliction of
mental distress."30 Warren and Brandeis suggested that the right
of privacy protects a person's appearance, sayings, acts, and per-
sonal relations.3' In 1931, California specifically recognized the
right of privacy in Melvin v. Reid.3 2 The court in Melvin defined
the right of privacy as "the right to live one's life in seclusion,
without being subjected to unwarranted and undesired publicity.
In short it is the right to be let alone.
'3 3
In 1960, Dean Prosser noted that invasion of privacy had
evolved into four distinct categories:
1. Intrusion into a person's seclusion or solitude, or into his pri-
vate affairs.
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the
plaintiff.
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the pub-
lic eye.
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plain-
tiff's name or likeness.3
Both the federal and state courts employ Prosser's four categories
when deciding issues involving invasion of privacy.3 Unfortu-
nately, several jurisdictions continue to improperly group misap-
propriation with the other three types of invasion of privacy. 6 The
first three categories are personal rights that involve an injury to
one's feelings3 7 because the injury is personal and subjective.8 On
29. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L.
REV. 193 (1890).
30. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 384 (1960).
31. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 29, at 213.
32. 297 P. 91, 92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931).
33. Id. at 92; see also Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co., 239 P.2d 630, 632 (Cal. 1952).
34. Prosser, supra note 30, at 389.
35. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 493 n.22 (1975); Carson v.
Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir. 1983); Uhlaender v. Hen-
ricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1279 (D. Minn. 1970); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425,
428 (Cal. 1979); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 133 (Wis. 1979);
Alonso v. Parfet, 318 S.E.2d 696, 698 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
36. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1992) (protecting commer-
cial interest in one's identity under "invasion of privacy"); Crump v. Beckley Newspapers
Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70, 85-86 (W. Va. 1984) (stating that appropriation is the most developed
form of invasion of privacy); Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 428-29 (holding that the right of publicity
is a personal right like the other types of invasion of privacy).
37. Uhlaender, 316 F. Supp. at 1280; Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity:
19941
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the other hand, misappropriation involves an economic interest in
the exploitation of a person's identity."9 Nevertheless, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that protection from misappropriation is a
personal right just like the other three versions of invasion of
privacy. 0
A. California Case Law
In Eastwood v. Superior Court4' the court recognized that
California case law adopted a four-factor approach for pleading a
right of publicity cause of action (hereinafter "the Eastwood fac-
tors"). These factors are:
1. The defendant's use of the plaintiff's identity;
2. The appropriation of the plaintiff's name or likeness to the
defendant's advantage, commercially or otherwise;
3. Lack of consent; and
4. Resulting injury.
4 2
Essentially, the California courts have recognized two different
manners in which a potential defendant may appropriate another's
name. The first manner involves a defendant using another's name
for the defendant's own commercial advantage.43 Usually, this type
of appropriation addresses the use of the plaintiff's name as part of
a commercial endorsement without the plaintiff's consent." Also,
because the California courts considered misappropriation to be a
Commercial Exploitation of the Associative Value of Personality, 39 VAND. L. REv. 1199,
1206 (1986).
38. Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 437 (Bird, C.J., dissenting); Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co., 239
P.2d 630, 632-33 (Cal. 1952); Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co., 291 P.2d 194, 196-
97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955)).
39. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977); Carson,
698 F.2d at 834.
40. Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 428-29.
41. 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
42. Id. at 347; Slivinsky v. Watkins-Johnson Co., 270 Cal. Rptr. 585, 589 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990); see also WILLAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 804-07 (4th ed. 1971). Al-
though the Ninth Circuit adopted the Eastwood factors, it does not strictly interpret the
"name" and "likeness" factor. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397
(9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
43. See, e.g., Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 347 (alleging an unauthorized appropriation
of Eastwood's name and likeness to endorse the National Enquirer); Johnson v. Harcourt,
Brace & Jovanovich, Inc., 118 Cal. Rptr. 370, 381 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (alleging that defend-
ant used plaintiff's name to sell textbooks).
44. See, e.g., Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co., 291 P.2d 194, 196 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1955) (defendant incorrectly claimed that plaintiff was a satisfied customer); Stryker v.
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personal wrong, a plaintiff could properly file suit even if only the
individual's reputation was damaged.'
5
The second manner in which a potential defendant can appro-
priate a celebrity's name is by using the celebrity's name as his
own. For example, in In re Weingand, 4  Eugene Weingand, a
struggling actor, sought to change his name to "Peter Lorie," but
the actor Peter Lorre opposed the petition.4' The evidence clearly
showed that Weingand attempted to use Lorre's name to his own
advantage.4 The Weingand court ruled that the appearance of an-
other actor with the name Peter Lorie "would directly affect the
commercial and professional value of the services and perform-
ances of Peter Lorre both present and future.
'49
Misappropriation of a person's name generally applied to pub-
lic figures because their personas have commercially exploitable
value.5 0 A person may become a public figure by his status in the
entertainment industry" or by actions or events that generate
public interest.52  Earlier California cases, however, also held that
45. See, e.g., Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 127 P.2d 577 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942). As
part of a promotional campaign, Hal Roach Studios sent out 1,000 handwritten letters bear-
ing Kerby's name and signature. Id. at 578-79. According to the appellate court, the letter's
contents appeared to be a solicitation for an illicit rendezvous. Id. at 579. The court con-
cluded, therefore, that the defendant invaded Kerby's privacy because "mortifying notori-
ety" damaged her reputation. Id. at 580.
46. 41 Cal. Rptr. 778 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964).
47. Id. at 779. Peter Lorre appeared in over 150 feature motion pictures. Id. at 780.
One of Lorre's most famous roles was his portrayal of Cairo in the 1941 film, THE MALTESE
FALCON. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 102 F. Supp. 141,
149 (S.D. Cal. 1951), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 971 (1955).
48. Weingand, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 780. Another example of a person attempting to profit
from another's fame occurred in 1990. Bill English, a Tempe, Arizona grocery bagger,
claimed he was Billy Thomas, the actor who played "Buckwheat" in the "Our Gang" and
"Little Rascals" comedies. Steve Weinstein, '20/20' Producer Resigns Over Buckwheat In-
terview, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1990, at F25.
49. Weingand, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 782. The court's ruling is quite curious because the
court protected Peter Lorre's name even though Lorre died before the proceedings had con-
cluded. Id. at 779. When Lorre died, misappropriation was not a descendible cause of action.
See, e.g., James v. Screen Gems, Inc., 344 P.2d 799, 801 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959); Kelly v. John-
son Publishing Co., 325 P.2d 659, 661 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958). It therefore appears that the
Weingand court implied that misappropriation was a survivable cause of action. In 1984,
however, the California Legislature decided to allow a cause of action for misappropriation
after the person's death. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 990 (Deering 1992); infra notes 267-76 and
accompanying text.
50. Leonard A. Wohl, Note, The Right of Publicity and Vocal Larceny: Sounding Off
on Sound Alikes, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 445, 445 n.3 (1988).
51. See, e.g., Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (ac-
tor); In re Weingand, 41 Cal. Rptr. 778 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964) (actor); Kelly v. Johnson Pub-
lishing Co., 325 P.2d 659 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958) (professional boxer).
52. See, e.g., Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace & Jovanovich, Inc., 118 Cal. Rptr. 370 (Cal.
19941
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protection from name appropriation extended to individuals with
less name recognition than well-known celebrities. A lesser-known
celebrity" or even a "private" individual 4 could bring an action.
Also, the common law did not require deliberate appropriation55
because "[i]nadvertence or mistake is no defense where the publi-
cation does in fact refer to the plaintiff in such a matter as to vio-
late his right of privacy." ''"
Cases involving misappropriation of likeness" were not as
common as cases involving misappropriation of one's name.5  How-
ever, the likeness cases reflected a similar pattern in the California
common law. A public figure,59 an individual whose actions gener-
ated public interest, ° or even a private individual could bring a
cause of action.6 1
Earlier case law specifically addressed "likeness" in the inva-
Ct. App. 1974) (finding and returning $240,000); James v. Screen Gems, Inc., 344 P.2d 799
(Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (famous outlaw); Stryker v. Republic Pictures, 238 P.2d 670 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1951) (war hero); Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 95 P.2d 491 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939)
(suicide).
53. Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 127 P.2d 577, 578 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942). Marion
Kerby was an actress and concert singer with many years of experience in the United States
and Europe. Id. At the time of the appropriation in question, however, Hal Roach Studios
was not aware of Kerby's existence. Id. at 581.
54. Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co., 291 P.2d 194, 196 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955)
(plaintiff was an attorney).
55. Id. at 197 (stating that the defendant's motives for invading another's privacy were
immaterial). See also Kerby, 127 P.2d at 581 (stating that the defendant's lack of intent to
cause injury was no defense to the plaintiff's cause of action).
56. Fairfield, 291 P.2d at 197; Kerby, 127 P.2d at 581.
57. The Central District of California defines likeness as "an actual representation of a
person, rather than a close resemblance." Nurmi v. Peterson, 16 Media L. Rep. 1606, 1607
(C.D. Cal. 1989). Although the Nurmi court defined likeness with respect to California stat-
utory law, the court's definition is applicable to the common law as well. For example, Clint
Eastwood could properly allege appropriation of his likeness because his picture appeared in
an advertisement for the National Enquirer. Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr.
342, 345, 349 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). An advertisement that used a robot with an appearance
similar to Vanna White, however, was not an appropriation of White's likeness. White v.
Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443
(1993).
58. See Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 823 n.6 (9th Cir.
1974) (only 5 out of the 20 decisions cited specifically addressed misappropriation of like-
ness); see Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 253 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1953); Gill v. Curtis Publishing
Co., 239 P.2d 630 (Cal. 1952); Leavy v. Cooney, 29 Cal. Rptr. 580 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963);
Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962); Metter v. Los
Angeles Examiner, 95 P.2d 491 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939).
59. See, e.g., Carlisle, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 407 (actress Janet Leigh).
60. See, e.g., Metter, 95 P.2d at 493 (woman who committed suicide).
61. See, e.g., Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co., 239 P.2d 630, 631 (Cal. 1952) (husband and
wife who owned an ice cream stand).
[Vol. 11:321
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sion of privacy context 2 The courts considered the use of a per-
son's likeness to be an invasion of privacy if the damage to a per-
son's feelings or reputation outweighed the public interest in the
dissemination of news and information." Additionally, the courts
required appropriation of the individual's exact likeness or image."
The appearance of a merely close or suggestive resemblance was
not sufficient.65
B. California Statutory Law
In 1971, the California Legislature recognized the right of pub-
licity by passing Civil Code section 3344.66 Originally, section
3344(a) provided that any person who used another's name, photo-
graph, or likeness for advertising purposes without the other per-
son's consent would be liable for any injury sustained.7 In 1984,
the legislature amended section 3344 to also protect against the
unconsented use of another's voice or signature. 8
A section 3344(a) action is more burdensome to establish than
a right of publicity action. In addition to proving that all the East-
wood factors are present,"' the plaintiff must also prove that his
62. See, e.g., Gill, 239 P.2d 630 (Cal. 1952); Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 95 P.2d
491 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939).
63. Compare Metter, 95 P.2d at 496 (holding that a newspaper account of a woman's
suicide was not an invasion of privacy because the publication was a matter of public con-
cern) with Gill, 239 P.2d at 634-35 (holding that publication of a photograph that depicted a
husband and wife in an affectionate embrace constituted an invasion of privacy because
there was no legitimate public interest in the accompanying article).
64. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1402-03 (9th Cir. 1992) (Alar-
con, J., concurring and dissenting), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993); see also Eastwood v.
Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (referring only to appropriation of
name, photograph, or likeness).
65. Nurmi v. Peterson, 16 Media L. Rep. 1606, 1608-09 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that
no cause of action existed because Cassandra Peterson's character "Elvira" was not an exact
copy of the 1950s television character "Vampira").
66. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 428 n.6 (Cal. 1979); Eastwood, 198 Cal.
Rptr. at 346.
67. 1971 Cal. Stat. ch 1595 § 1; Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
68. The current version of California Civil Code § 3344(a) states:
[a]ny person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph,
or likeness, in any manner. . . for purposes of advertising or selling. . . without
such person's prior consent. . . shall be liable for any damages sustained by the
person or persons injured as result thereof.
Section 3344(b) defines "photograph" as meaning:
any photograph or photographic reproduction, still or moving, or any videotape
or live television transmission, of any person such that the person is readily
identifiable.
CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 3344(a),(b) (Deering 1992).
69. See text accompanying note 42.
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persona was knowingly used and that there was a "direct" connec-
tion between the use and the commercial purpose.7 0 Apparently, if
a defendant proves that he unintentionally appropriated the plain-
tiff's identity, then the defendant defeats a section 3344(a) action,
but this same claim would not fail under the common law.71
The courts strictly interpret California Civil Code section
3344(a). 72 Two examples of this strict interpretation appear in
cases involving appropriations of likeness and voice. 73 Likeness re-
fers to an individual's exact image .7  A close facsimile is not suffi-
cient.75 The same reasoning also applies with respect to a person's
voice.7 6 The imitation of a person's voice, even a virtually exact
imitation, does not constitute a cause of action under section
3344(a) because the actual voice was not appropriated.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF A RIGHT OF PUBLICITY IN ONE'S IDENTITY
Fortunately for many plaintiffs, recovery for misappropriation
of name or likeness under California Civil Code section 3344 and
similar statutes78 is not the exclusive means of protecting a per-
son's identity from unauthorized commercial appropriation.7 9 A ce-
70. Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 347 (citing Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace & Jovanovich,
Inc., 118 Cal. Rptr. 370, 381 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (stating that reprinting a magazine article
in a college textbook was not a commercial appropriation because the article was not di-
rectly connected with the sale of the textbook and the article was only used as an educa-
tional tool)).
71. See infra notes 179-97 and accompanying text (arguing that in a right of publicity
action, the defendants should be held to a "knew or should have known" standard).
72. See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1573 (1992).
73. See infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
74. Nurmi v. Peterson, 16 Media L. Rep. 1606, 1607-08 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that
"likeness" means an exact copy of another's features and not a merely close or suggestive
resemblance); see also White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir.
1992) (stating that a Vanna White-like robot is not her likeness), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
2443 (1993).
75. Nurmi, 16 Media L. Rep. at 1607-08.
76. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463 (discussing voice appropriation).
77. Id.; Nurmi, 16 Media L. Rep. at 1607.
78. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08(1) (West 1991) (protecting a person's name,
portrait, photograph, and other likeness); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 598.790 (Michie 1994)
(finding a right of publicity in a person's name, voice, signature, photograph, and likeness);
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (Michie 1992) (finding the right of publicity in a person's name,
portrait, and picture only).
79. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CoDE § 3344(g) (Deering 1992). "The remedies provided for
this section are cumulative and shall be in addition to any others provided for by law." Id.
But see People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 867 P.2d
1121, 1136 (Nev. 1994) (concluding that a right of publicity cause of action can only be
brought under statutory law); Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580,
584 (N.Y. 1984) (same).
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lebrity (or any other individual) may still file an action under the
right of publicity.80 While a defendant may appropriate an individ-
ual's actual name or likeness,8' many courts do not confine the
right of publicity to these traditional, strict boundaries. Several
courts expand the right to include many different aspects of a ce-
lebrity's identity.2
A. Cases in Support of Misappropriation of Identity
This subsection analyzes decisions that expanded the scope of
the right of publicity. Cases in which the courts concluded that a
defendant appropriated an aspect of a celebrity's identity fall into
at least four categories: (1) Appropriation by Association;8" (2)
Voice Appropriation; 84 (3) Appropriation of a Pseudonym;85 and
(4) Appropriation by Similar Appearance. 6 These categories are
not the only means of appropriation. They simply illustrate differ-
ent cases in which the courts expanded the right of publicity be-
yond an individual's actual name or likeness. The courts expanded
protection because "[i]t is not important how the defendant has
appropriated the plaintiffs identity, but whether the defendant
has done so.''87 These cases also illustrate the need to protect a
celebrity's identity as a whole and not just certain personal traits.
1. Appropriation by Association
"Appropriation by Association" concerns incidents in which
the defendant associates a celebrity with images that appear in a
commercial, but the actual celebrity does not appear in the adver-
tisement. This type of appropriation first appeared in Mot-
80. See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992)
(causes of action filed under California Civil Code § 3344 and the right of publicity), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
81. See, e.g., Cher v. Forum Int'l, Ltd., 692 F.2d 634, 638 (9th Cir. 1982) (using Cher's
name to create the appearance of an implied endorsement), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1120
(1983); Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (superimposing Cary
Grant's face onto another actor's body); Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 345, 352
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (finding a possible cause of action because the National Enquirer used
Clint Eastwood's name and likeness to promote sales).
82. See infra notes 88-158 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 88-110 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 111-29 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 130-41 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 142-58 and accompanying text.
87. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am. Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
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schenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.88 Lothar Mot-
schenbacher was an internationally known race car driver,8' who,
as part of his image, "individualized" his race car to set it apart
from the other cars.' 0 R.J. Reynolds produced a television commer-
cial for Winston cigarettes that contained a slightly altered photo-
graph of Motschenbacher's vehicle, giving the appearance that
Winston sponsored the race car.' 1
Even though R.J. Reynolds did not use Motschenbacher's ac-
tual race car and the company did not identify Motschenbacher as
the driver, the Ninth Circuit held that a cause of action under the
right of publicity existed as matter of law.' 2 The commercial cre-
ated the appearance that Motschenbacher endorsed Winston ciga-
rettes.' Because the race car represented a symbol of Mot-
schenbacher's identity, the court held that misappropriation
occurred."
The New York state courts recognized a legitimate proprietary
interest in an individual's public personality in Lombardo v. Doyle,
Dane & Bernach, Inc. 5 Guy Lombardo was known as "Mr. New
Year's Eve" because the public associated him with the combina-
tion of New Year's Eve, balloons, party hats, and the song "Auld
Lang Syne." '" In Lombardo, the defendants aired a television com-
mercial that featured an actor conducting a band using the same
gestures as Lombardo.' Additionally, the New Year's Eve party
theme surrounded the actor.' 8 Even though the commercial did not
mention Lombardo's name and the actor did not resemble him, the
court ruled that the determination of whether the likeness de-
picted Lombardo was a question of fact for the jury."e
88. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
89. Id. at 822.
90. Id. Motschenbacher's car had a narrow white pinstripe, solid red decals, and an
oval around his number "11" while all other drivers had a circle around their numbers. Id.
91. Id. R.J. Reynolds altered the photograph of the car by changing "11" to "71" and
adding a spoiler to the back of the car on which the word "Winston" appeared. Id.
92. Id. at 827 (reversing the district court's summary judgment in favor of the
defendant).
93. Id. at 822-23.
94. Id. at 824 (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 805-06 (4th ed.
1971) (pirating a celebrity's identity for another's commercial gain is misappropriation)).
95. 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (App. Div. 1977).
96. Id. at 664.
97. Id. (Titone, J., concurring and dissenting). Justices Titone and Suozzi concurred
with the majority on the third cause of action. Id. (Titone, J., concurring and dissenting).
They agreed that Lombardo stated a cause of action for appropriation of his public person-
ality for commercial purposes. Id. (Titone, J., concurring and dissenting).
98. Id. at 665 (Titone, J., concurring and dissenting).
99. Id. (Titone, J., concurring and dissenting); see also Motown Record Corp. v.
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The Ninth Circuit further expanded the concept of appropria-
tion by association in White v. Samsung Electronics America,
Inc.1"' Vanna White is the hostess of "Wheel of Fortune," one of
the most popular game shows in television history.101 David
Deutsch Associates prepared a humorous ad campaign for Sam-
sung Electronics that depicted Samsung's products being used in
the future.102 The ad in question was for Samsung VCRs and de-
picted a robot wearing a blonde wig, a designer gown, and large
jewelry.103 Furthermore, the robot was posing like White on a game
show set identical to the "Wheel of Fortune" set.104 The underlying
caption stated "Longest Running Game Show - 2012 A.D."1 5 Sam-
sung and Deutsch referred to the advertisement as the "Vanna
White ad."106
The Ninth Circuit decided that White had stated a valid cause
of action under the right of publicity.10 7 The court determined that
George Hormel & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1236 (C.D. Cal. 1987). Motown filed suit over a televi-
sion commercial for Hormel beef stew. Id. at 1237. The ad featured three black women
singing "Dinty Moore," a parody of "Baby Love" by "The Supremes." Id. The court ruled
that the plaintiff properly stated an action for trademark infringement due to a possible
protected interest in the persona or likeness of "The Supremes." Id. at 1240-41.
100. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
101. Id. at 1396.
102. Id. Each of the ads was designed to depict a Samsung product in a humorous
manner. Debbie Seaman, Samsung Has Seen the Future: Brace Yourself, ADWEEK, Oct. 3,
1988, at 118. One ad for Samsung televisions depicted talk show host Morton Downey, Jr. as
"Presidential Candidate. 2008 A.D." Id. An ad for Samsung microwaves featured a raw
steak as "Revealed to be health food. 2010 A.D." Id. A third ad that promoted Samsung
VCRs showed a videocassette of "Rambo XXIII" as "The summer's hottest rental. 2005
A.D." Id.
103. White, 971 F.2d at 1396.
104. Id.
105. Id. For an example of the ad in question, see Samsung advertisement, FORBES,
Sept. 19, 1988, at 78-79. Some copies of the ad also contained an accompanying caption
which began "In the next century, will 'she' still be America's favorite gameshow [sic] host-
ess?" Vanna White Lawsuit Can Go to Trial, THE GAZETTE (Montreal), July 30, 1992, at
B7.
106. White, 971 F.2d at 1396.
107. Id. at 1399 (reversing the district court's summary judgment in favor of the
defendants).
White also filed causes of action under California Civil Code § 3344(a) and the Lanham
Act, which concerns trademark infringement. Id. at 1396, 1399. The Ninth Circuit concluded
that the § 3344 claim failed because the robot was not White's likeness as required by stat-
ute. Id. at 1397. For a further discussion of California Civil Code § 3344, see supra notes 66-
77 and accompanying text.
Surprisingly, the Ninth Circuit also determined that White stated a valid claim under
the Lanham Act. White, 971 F.2d at 1401. The court examined the factors for determining
whether "a likelihood of confusion" exists between an original trademark and an alleged
infringing work. Id. at 1399. The court stretched the test to include a person's identity as an
identifiable mark. Id. The Ninth Circuit's interpretation may expand trademark law beyond
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the right is not strictly limited to the actual appropriation of a per-
son's name or likeness." 8 "If the celebrity's identity is commer-
cially exploited, there has been an invasion of [her] right whether
or not [her] 'name or likeness' is used."'' 09 Thus, the Ninth Circuit
expanded the right of publicity to protect a person's identity from
unauthorized commercial exploitation. 011
2. Voice Appropriation
Some jurisdictions specifically prohibit the unauthorized ap-
propriation of an individual's voice."' Under the Ninth Circuit's
its intended objectives. See id. at 1405-07 (Alarcon, J., concurring and dissenting). Lanham
Act issues, however, are beyond the scope of this Comment.
108. Id. at 1397-98. The Ninth Circuit discussed the right of publicity as stated in
Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). White, 971 F.2d at
1397. The court reasoned that because the Eastwood court did not consider the right of
publicity beyond "name and likeness," the two categories were not the exclusive bounds of
the right. Id.
109. Id. at 1398 (quoting Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831,
835 (6th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added)).
110. Id. at 1399. But see Nurmi v. Peterson, 16 Media L. Rep. 1606, 1609 (C.D. Cal.
1989) (concluding that Nurmi failed to state a right of publicity claim because Nurmi did
not allege that the character Elvira appropriated Nurmi's actual features).
Some critics argue that the White decision expands the right of publicity so far that it
now hinders the creative ability of others. See, e.g., White, 971 F.2d at 1407-08 (Alarcon, J.,
concurring and dissenting); Gretchen A. Pemberton, The Parodist's Claim to Fame: A Par-
ody Exception to the Right of Publicity, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 97, 99-100 (1993).
The Ninth Circuit, however, did not conclusively hold that the Samsung advertisement
appropriated White's identity. See White, 971 F.2d at 1399. The court merely reasoned that
White properly stated a cause of action under the right of publicity. Id. Thus, it was still up
to a jury to determine whether Samsung invoked White's identity to imply a commercial
endorsement. In fact, after remand to the district court, a jury found in White's favor and
awarded $403,000 in damages. Shauna Snow, Jury Sides With Vanna, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 21,
1994, at F2.
111. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 3344(a) (Deering 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 598.790 (Michie 1994); TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.011 (Vernon 1992).
However, in New York, an individual may not file a cause of action based on an unau-
thorized appropriation or imitation of his voice. The Court of Appeals has ruled that a com-
mon law right of publicity does not exist in New York. Stephano v. News Group Publica-
tions, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 584 (N.Y. 1984). A claim cannot be pursued under New York
Civil Rights Law § 50 because the statute does not protect against voice appropriation. N.Y.
Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1992) (referring only to appropriation of one's name, por-
trait, or picture); Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826, 837-38
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding no cause of action under New York Civil Rights Law for using
"sound alikes" in a television commercial). Furthermore, an individual cannot claim unfair
competition due to voice imitation. Booth v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 345-49
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
For a further discussion of New York law regarding the right of publicity in general, see
infra notes 300-321 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of New York law as it
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approach in Midler v. Ford Motor Co." 2 and Waits v. Frito-Lay,
Inc.," 3 a celebrity can properly invoke the right of publicity, even
when a person imitates the celebrity's voice to such a degree that it
sounds like the actual celebrity endorses the product.""
The fact patterns of Midler and Waits are very similar. In
Midler, Ford launched a series of television commercials called the
"Yuppie Campaign. 1" 5 In an effort to emotionally connect with
the Yuppies, Ford's advertisers attempted to hire the original sing-
ers of popular songs of the 1970s." When Bette Midler" 7 refused
to sing "Do You Want to Dance?" to promote Ford, Ford hired
another singer to sound exactly like Midler. s8
In Waits, Frito-Lay hired Tracy-Locke to produce a radio
commercial for a new brand of potato chips.1 9 Tracy-Locke
wanted to parody a Tom Waits ' 20 song, "Step Right Up,"'' but
Waits refused to perform commercial endorsements as a matter of
principle. 22 Instead, Tracy-Locke made a commercial using a
singer who could imitate Waits.2 3 Despite reservations regarding
possible legal implications, Frito-Lay aired the commercial that
used the Waits "sound-alike.'
12'
Even though these commercials did not include the actual
voices of Midler and Waits, in both cases, the Ninth Circuit held
that a jury could properly conclude that the defendant had appro-
priated the celebrity's identity.125 When a seller deliberately imi-
112. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1573 (1992).
113. 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1047 (1993).
114. See infra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
115. Midler, 849 F.2d at 461.
116. Id.
117. Midler won the Grammy Award in 1973 for Best New Artist, and she continues to
have a successful singing career. Id. at 461. Midler has also appeared in several films includ-
ing BEACHES, RUTHLESS PEOPLE, and DOWN AND OUT IN BEVERLY HILLS. Kent Black, Best
Bette, NEWSDAY, Nov. 21, 1991, § II, at 68.
118. Midler, 849 F.2d at 461-62.
119. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 1047 (1993).
120. Tom Waits is a songwriter and a professional singer with a unique, raspy style.
Id. at 1097. He has recorded more than seventeen albums and has toured extensively in the
United States and overseas. Id. In 1987, Rolling Stone magazine awarded Waits its Critic's
Award for Best Live Performance. Id.
121. Id. Ironically, "Step Right Up" is an indictment of advertising. Id. at 1097 and
n.1.
122. Id. at 1097.
123. Id. at 1097-98.
124. Id. at 1098.
125. Id. at 1102 (upholding jury verdict because the verdict was based on substantial
evidence); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (reversing summary
judgment in favor of the defendant and remanding the case for trial), cert. denied, 112 S.
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tates a widely known professional singer's voice 126 to sell a product,
the seller commits a tort. 27 The Ninth Circuit also concluded that
"[a] voice is as distinctive and personal as a face. The human voice
is one of the most palpable ways identity is manifested. '' M There-
fore, impersonating a celebrity's voice for one's own commercial
gain is the same as pirating the celebrity's identity.1
29
3. Appropriation of a Pseudonym
Another form of unauthorized appropriation occurs when a
defendant appropriates a celebrity's recognizable pseudonym. In
Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 30 the identity
trait at issue was the phrase "Here's Johnny," which was Johnny
Carson's introduction to "The Tonight Show"'' for thirty years.
132
Carson also used the phrase to promote a line of clothing apparel
and a line of men's toiletries. 33
The toilet company's founder was aware of Carson's famous
introduction, but he still took advantage of the phrase by renting
and selling "Here's Johnny" portable toilets without Carson's con-
sent.' 3 ' The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the right of publicity was a
protected pecuniary interest in the commercial exploitation of a
celebrity's identity.'3 5 Therefore, a potential defendant could im-
properly exploit a celebrity's identity without using the person's
Ct. 1513 (1992).
126. The Ninth Circuit defines a "widely known professional singer" as a singer who is
"known to be a large number of people throughout a relatively large geographic area."
Waits, 978 F.2d at 1102 (quoting the district court's jury instruction). The Ninth Circuit did
not address the possible situation in which a person imitates a relatively unknown singer's
voice. While this type of scenario is unlikely, the courts may apply a "knew or should have
known" standard to determine if a defendant is liable for voice appropriation. See infra
notes 179-91 and accompanying text.
127. Midler, 849 F.2d at 460; see also Waits, 978 F.2d at 1098.
128. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463; see also Waits, 978 F.2d at 1102.
129. See Midler, 849 F.2d at 463 (citing W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON
ON TORTS § 117, at 852 (5th ed. 1984)).
Courts have allowed a cause of action for the unauthorized imitation of another's voice
on grounds other than the right of publicity. In Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co., 300 F.2d 256
(1st Cir. 1962), Adell Chemical hired an actor to imitate Bert Lahr's voice for a television
commercial. Id. at 257. Because the imitation was performed without Lahr's permission, the
First Circuit held that Lahr properly stated a claim for unfair competition. Id. at 259.
130. 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
131. Id. at 832.
132. Carson hosted "The Tonight Show" from October 1, 1962 to May 22, 1992. See
Rick DuBrow, The Sun Sets on Johnny's Last Tonight, L.A. TIMES, May 23, 1992, at Al.
133. Carson, 698 F.2d at 833.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 835.
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full name or image.1"'
In Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc.,5 the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court reached a conclusion that parallels the Sixth Circuit's
holding in Carson. The court in Hirsch addressed the appropria-
tion of the name "Crazylegs," which was the nickname of Elroy
Hirsch, 1 8 a famous professional football player. 3 9 S.C. Johnson
used this nickname to promote its shaving gel even though the
company knew that Crazylegs was Hirsch's nickname. '4 The Wis-
consin Supreme Court ruled that the determination of whether
Johnson appropriated Hirsch's identity was a question of fact. Ac-
cording to the court, the fact that Crazylegs "was a nickname
rather than Hirsch's actual name does not preclude a cause of ac-
tion. All that is required is that the name clearly identify the
wronged person. 141
4. Appropriation by Similar Appearance
In both Ali v. Playgirl, Inc."2 and Allen v. National Video,
Inc.,14 1 the New York federal court held that a celebrity may sus-
tain a cause of action for misappropriation of name or likeness
even if the defendant only employed an actor with a similar ap-
pearance.144 New York statutory law provides that any instance in
which a defendant appropriates an individual's name, portrait, or
picture without the individual's consent is actionable.1 45 Any recog-
136. Id. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that "a stage or other fictitious name can be so
identified with the plaintiff that he is entitled to protection against its use." Id. at 836; see
also Prosser, supra note 30, at 404. For example, Samuel Clemens would have a cause of
action if either his true name or "Mark Twain" was used in advertising without Clemens'
permission. Carson, 698 F.2d at 836; Prosser, supra note 30, at 404 n.172.
Carson also filed suit for unfair competition under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Carson,
698 F.2d at 833. However, Carson failed to show that the use of "Here's Johnny" established
a likelihood of confusion which is necessary to sustain a § 43(a) action. Id. at 833-34.
137. 280 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979).
138. Id. at 130.
139. Id. at 131. Hirsch was a 1942 All-American at the University of Wisconsin and a
running back for the Los Angeles Rams from 1949 to 1957. Id. In 1970, he was named to the
"All Time All-Pro Team" for the first 50 years of football. Id.
140. Id. at 130.
141. Id. at 137. But see Marriot Corp. v. Ramada, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 726, 728 n.3
(S.D.N.Y. 1993). The district court concluded that the use of the surname "Marriot" in a
television commercial did not violate the plaintiff's rights because the surname alone did not
clearly identify J.W. Marriot. Id. (citing Maggio v. Charles Scribner's Sons, 130 N.Y.S.2d
574, 517-18 (Mag. Ct. 1954)).
142. 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
143. 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
144. Id. at 622-23.
145. New York Civil Rights Law § 50 states:
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nizable likeness, not only similarity to the celebrity's actual image,
will qualify.
146
In Ali, Muhammed Ali 47 sued the magazine Playgirl over an
unauthorized portrait which depicted a nude black man with a
striking resemblance to Ali sitting in the corner of a boxing ring.14 8
An accompanying verse to the portrait referred to the "Mystery
Man" as "The Greatest."" 9 The overall image that Playgirl cre-
ated would probably have caused the public to mistake the "Mys-
tery Man" for Ali.150  Therefore, the district court held that
Playgirl's portrait wrongfully appropriated Ali's likeness. 51
In Allen, Woody Allen'52 sued over a print advertisement for
National Video that depicted a look-alike masquerading as Al-
A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for the pur-
poses of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person without having
first obtained the written consent of such person. . . is guilty of a misdemeanor.
New York Civil Rights Law § 51 states:
Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used . for advertising purposes
or for the purposes of trade without the written consent first obtained . . . may
maintain an equitable action . ..to prevent and restrain the use thereof; and
may also sue and recover damages for any injuries sustained . . . if the defend-
ant shall have knowingly used ...[in violation of section 50].
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1992).
146. The Allen court recognized a line of New York cases that held "any recognizable
likeness, not just an actual photograph, may qualify as a 'portrait or picture'" under New
York Civil Rights Law § 51. Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 622-23; see also Ali, 447 F. Supp. at 726
(concluding that a picture of an individual with features very similar to Muhammed Ali
constituted a "portrait or picture" of Ali); Onassis v. Christian Dior of N.Y., Inc., 472
N.Y.S.2d 254, 257 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (holding that the appearance of a Jacqueline Onassis
look-alike in a photograph with actual celebrities created the illusion that Onassis appeared
in the advertisement), aff'd, 110 A.D.2d 1095 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); Young v. Greneker
Studios, Inc., 26 N.Y.S.2d 357, 358 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941) (holding that a mannequin made in
the plaintiff's likeness was a "portrait or picture" of the plaintiff).
The foregoing cases reflect an expansive view of a "portrait or picture." However, a
recognizable likeness must still be present. For example, in 1989, Timex aired a commercial
that featured a psychic who could bend metal objects. Felix H. Kent, California Court Ex-
pands Celebrities' Rights, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 30, 1992, at 3. Alleged psychic Uri Geller claimed
that the portrayal appropriated his identity. Id. However, a New York district court con-
cluded that a claim did not exist under New York Civil Rights Law because the commercial
did not use Geller's name or likeness. Id.
147. Ali is a three-time heavyweight boxing champion, and he is possibly the most
recognizable athlete in the world. Bert Rosenthal, Physical Ailments Have Done Little to
Slow Down Ambassador Ali, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1992, at C8.
148. Ali, 447 F. Supp. at 725.
149. Id. at 727. During his boxing career, Ali referred to himself as "The Greatest,"
and the media regularly identified Ali as such. Id.
150. Id. at 729.
151. Id.
152. Woody Allen became famous for his work as a writer, director, actor, and come-
dian. Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). His works include
the films ANNIE HALL, MANHATrAN, BANANAS, and THE PURPLE ROSE OF CAIRO. Id.
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len. 158 As in Ali, the evidence clearly showed that National Video
had made a deliberate attempt to create the appearance of Allen
endorsing the defendant's product.154 National Video made virtu-
ally no effort to avoid any confusion between the "real" and "fake"
Woody Allens. 55 Even though the defendant did not use Allen's
actual image, the district court concluded that National Video
could be liable.1 56 The court determined that "most persons who
could identify an actual photograph of [Allen] would be likely to
think that this was actually his picture."' 57 Therefore, by using a
look alike, National Video violated Allen's right to privacy under
statutory law.1
58
As the four categories of cases strongly suggest, protection
from unwanted commercial appropriation should be extended to
all aspects of a celebrity's identity. The courts should extend pro-
tection regardless of the form of the appropriation.159 Partial pro-
tection for one's name, likeness, or other specified trait will not
fully insulate a celebrity from unauthorized exploitation. 160
The court should employ a more liberal approach to the right
of publicity because a strict rule provides advertisers with the op-
portunity to associate a celebrity's persona with a particular prod-
153. Id.
154. Id. at 624. The district court considered several factors. First, the advertisement
portrayed a customer in a video store, and the customer displayed very similar physical
features. Id. at 617-18. The customer posed in a manner typical of Allen. Id. at 618. The
store's counter top displayed video cassettes of Allen's films and films that Allen parodied in
PLAY IT AGAIN, SAM. Id. Also, the woman behind the counter acted excitedly, as though she
saw a celebrity. Id. Finally, the advertisement's headnote read "Become a V.I.P. at National
Video - We'll Make You Feel Like a Star." Id.
155. An advertisement that ran in Video Review contained a disclaimer in small print,
but no disclaimers appeared in any other advertisement. Id. In a later decision, the district
court ruled that even if a disclaimer is present, a celebrity could still maintain a cause of
action under New York statutory law. See Allen v. Men's World Outlet, Inc., 679 F. Supp.
369, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
156. Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 624. A similar line of reasoning may be developing in Louisiana case law. In
Prudhomme v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 800 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. La. 1992), New Orleans chef
Paul Prudhomme sued Proctor & Gamble after the company aired a television commercial
that depicted an actor with a striking resemblance to Prudhomme. Id. at 392. Although the
district court held that Louisiana had not specifically adopted the right of publicity, the
court acknowledged that it did not preclude the right either. Id. at 396. Therefore, the court
allowed Prudhomme to proceed with his argument, but it did not make a final ruling as to
whether it would recognize the right of publicity in the instant case. Id.
159. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that "the right of publicity does not require that
appropriation of identity be accomplished through particular means to be actionable."
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uct."6' "A rule which says that the right of publicity can be in-
fringed only through the use of nine different methods of
appropriating identity merely challenges the clever advertising
strategist to come up with the tenth."1 62 Therefore, the courts
should protect celebrities' commercial interests in their identities
rather than just their actual names or images. 68 Otherwise, an un-
authorized exploitation may occur whenever the public mistakenly
believes that a celebrity endorses a product.""
B. The Totality of the Circumstances Approach
Because the right of publicity should protect one's identity as
a whole, a court's inquiry into whether a violation occurred should
not be limited to an examination of certain specified characteris-
tics. Although not referring to its methods as such, many courts
examine the "totality of the circumstances"16 5 to determine
whether a defendant has appropriated an individual's identity.
The courts already apply the totality approach extensively in both
civil 66 and criminal16 7 contexts. As applied specifically to the right
161. Id.
162. Id. One example of clever advertising appears in the television commercials for
California Grapes. One commercial featured a silver gloved, gyrating raisin who was singing
"I Heard It Through the Grapevine" in a high falsetto voice. Lucy May, Raisin Serial, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 19, 1989, at 1D. Even though the commercial did not use his actual
name, likeness, or voice, the raisin clearly represented Michael Jackson. See id.
163. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983);
see also Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (recognizing appropria-
tion as an injury to one's identity), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1513 (1992); Uhlaender v. Hen-
ricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1970) (holding that a celebrity's identity is the
fruit of his labor and is entitled to legal protection); Prosser, supra note 30, at 401 n.155
(acknowledging the possibility of appropriating a plaintiff's identity without using either the
plaintiff's name or likeness).
164. The Ninth Circuit concluded that "the specific means of appropriation are rele-
vant only for determining whether the defendant has in fact appropriated the plaintiff's
identity." White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
165. See infra notes 168-77 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (arbitrary discriminatory
purpose may often be inferred from the totality of relevant facts); Clamp Mfg. Co. v. Enco
Mfg. Co., 870 F.2d 512, 517 (9th Cir.) (using the totality approach to determine whether
trademark infringement had occurred), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 872 (1989); Foley v. Interac-
tive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 387 (Cal. 1988) (examining the totality of the circumstances
to determine the nature of a contract); Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner, 721 P.2d 87,
90 (Cal. 1986) (using the totality approach to determine whether a defamatory statement
was a statement of fact or of opinion), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1032 (1987); Isaacs v. Hunting-
ton Memorial Hosp., 695 P.2d 653, 661 (Cal. 1985) (discussing foreseeability in light of all
circumstances to determine whether a civil defendant is liable for a criminal attack by a
third party).
167. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-34 (1983) (applying the totality of the
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of publicity, some courts using the totality approach examine the
entire advertisement or endorsement in question to determine
whether an appropriation occurred. 168 While in many instances the
courts will examine a series of factors,' one factor alone may be
so significant that it is enough to raise appropriation questions.'
The courts determine whether the public will probably believe that
the celebrity endorsed the defendant's product,' or whether the
celebrity authorized, consented to, or approved of the use of his
identity.'72
Perhaps the best example of the totality approach appears in
White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc. 7 ' The Ninth Circuit
examined several different factors that appeared in the Samsung
advertisement.'74 The Samsung robot was wearing a designer gown,
a blond wig, and large jewelry, features which are all associated
circumstances to determine the reliability of informant information); Fare v. Michael C., 442
U.S. 707, 725-27 (1976) (examining the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a
juvenile waived his Fifth Amendment rights); Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 104
(1976) (using totality approach to determine whether a suggestive pre-trial identification
violated an accused's due process rights); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223-25
(1973) (using totality approach to determine whether there was a voluntary consent to a
search); People v. Wharton, 809 P.2d 290, 323-24 (Cal. 1991) (using totality approach to
determine whether an emergency situation justified a warrantless search), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 887 (1992).
168. See, e.g., Joplin Enters. v. Allen, 795 F. Supp. 349, 351 (W.D. Wash. 1992) (exam-
ining the stage play as a whole); Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 617-18
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (listing several factors which related to Woody Allen's identity); Staruski v.
Continental Tel. Co. of Vt., 581 A.2d 266, 271 (Vt. 1990) (stating that the advertisement
must be viewed as a whole). A court may even consider an entire advertising campaign if it
is relevant to the alleged appropriation in question. See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am.,
Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
169. See, e.g., Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 617-18 (listing several factors which relate to
Woody Allen's identity); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1348-49 (D.N.J.
1981) (comparing the elements of the defendant's stage show with Elvis Presley's show); Ali
v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 726-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (comparing several features of a
look-alike to Muhammed Ali).
170. See, e.g., Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 832 (6th
Cir. 1983) (associating the phrase "Here's Johnny" with Johnny Carson).
171. See, e.g., Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (using
an Allen look-alike); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (using an Ali
look-alike); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 137 (Wis. 1979) (using
Hirsch's nickname "Crazylegs").
172. See, e.g., Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 827 (9th
Cir. 1974) (concluding that the appearance of a similar race car led some people to believe
that Motschenbacher endorsed Winston cigarettes); Apple Corps Ltd. v. Leber, 12 Media L.
Rep. 2280, 2282-83 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1986) (finding a reasonable likelihood that the public
would believe the Beatles authorized, consented to, or approved BEATLEMANIA'S
performance).
173. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
174. Id. at 1399. For an analysis of the facts and holding in White, see supra notes
100-10 and accompanying text.
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with Vanna White.176 Also, the robot was on the "Wheel of For-
tune" set and was posing like White.17 By examining all of these
factors, one could conclude that Samsung commercially appropri-
ated White's identity.
177
C. Knew or Should Have Known Standard
Critics of the totality approach may argue that if the courts
use* this approach, they would be protecting a celebrity's identity
irrespective of how remote the reference to the celebrity may be.7 8
To belay these concerns, the courts may also examine the defend-
ant's state of mind. A defendant may possess one of three possible
states of mind when appropriating another's identity. An adver-
tiser or seller either: (1) knew that it appropriated a person's iden-
tity; (2) should have known that appropriation occurred without
authorization or consent; or (3) was unaware of the individual's ex-
istence, and any possible appropriation was only incidental. 79 Ac-
175. White, 971 F.2d at 1399.
176. Id.
177. Id. The totality approach also appears in Judge Goodwin's Michael Jordan
hypothetical:
Consider a hypothetical advertisement which depicts a mechanical robot with
male features, an African-American complexion, and a bald head. The robot is
wearing black hightop Air Jordan basketball sneakers, and a red basketball uni-
form with black trim, baggy shorts, and the number 23 (though not revealing
"Bulls" or "Jordan" lettering). The ad depicts the robot dunking a basketball
one-handed, stiff-armed, legs extended like open scissors, and tongue hanging
out. Now envision that this ad is run on television during professional football
games. Considered individually, the robot's physical attributes, its dress, and its
stance tell us little. Taken together, they lead to the only conclusion that any
sports viewer who has registered a discernible pulse in the past five years would
reach: the ad is about Michael Jordan.
Id.
178. See, e.g., Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 840 (6th
Cir. 1983) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Judge Kennedy asserted that the right of publicity
confers monopoly power on the protected individual. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Because
there is no statutory requirement, such as registration of a copyright or a trademark, the
public is on little notice of the right being exerted. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Extending
protection to anything merely associated with an individual provides virtually no notice as
to what is being protected. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Recent changes in copyright and trademark law, however, undermine Judge Kennedy's
argument. For an author to receive copyright protection, notice is only required for works
created before March 1, 1989. See 17 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1992) (stating that notice is only
required for all works created before the effective date of the Berne Convention Implemen-
tation Act of 1988). Also, under certain circumstances, notice is not required under trade-
mark law. See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992) (holding
that Lanham Act protection extends to common law trade dress).
179. The proposed standards regarding the defendant's state of mind in right of pub-
licity cases are similar to the existing standards for defamation cases. With respect to public
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cording to supporting case law, courts should hold a defendant lia-
ble under the "knew" or "should have known" standards, 80 but
not under the "incidental appropriation" standard."1 81
Generally, advertisers and their clients attempt to gain en-
dorsements from individuals who have "instant" name recogni-
tion,182 believing that associating a product with a "big name" ce-
lebrity attracts greater attention and results in higher product
sales.'8 3 Therefore, in most cases involving an alleged misappropri-
ation of a celebrity's identity, the potential defendants are well
aware of the possible perception of a celebrity endorsement.8 4
The "should have known" standard generally applies when a
defendant appropriates a lesser known person's identity for com-
mercial gain.'85 In these cases, a proper investigation would reveal
that a significant portion of the public associates the individual in
question with the product.'86 Sometimes a seller attempts to pro-
figures, the courts will hold a media defendant liable for publishing a defamatory statement
if the defendant knew the statement was false or recklessly disregarded the truth. Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162 (1967); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
279-80 (1964). The courts will not hold a media defendant liable if the defendant innocently
published the false statement. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 461 (1975) (holding
that a defendant cannot be strictly liable for a defamatory statement).
180. See infra notes 182-91 and accompanying text.
181. Cf. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 804-07 (4th ed. 1971) (stating
that mere coincidental use of a name is not sufficient; plaintiff must show pirating of iden-
tity for another's gain).
182. See, e.g., Phil Rabin & Carolyn Myles, Celebrity Soda Endorsements May Be
Losing Their Pop, WASH. TIMES, April 3, 1991, at C3 (using celebrity endorsements in soft
drink commercials).
183. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1283 (D. Minn.
1970); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 438 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
184. For example, in Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 1047 (1993), Tracy-Locke hired an actor to sing exactly like Tom Waits, and
advertising executives raised concerns regarding possible legal implications because of the
near-perfect imitation. Id. at 1097-98. In Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1513 (1992), Ford hired "sound-alikes" for its advertising
campaign after the original singers would not employ their services. Id. at 461. Also, in
Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983), the defendant
was aware that "Here's Johnny" was Carson's introduction to "The Tonight Show." Id. at
833.
185. See, e.g., Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co., 291 P.2d 194, 195 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1955) (plaintiff was an attorney).
186. A good example appears in Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 127 P.2d 577 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1942). At the time the studio signed Marion Kerby's name onto letters that "pro-
moted" a movie, the studio did not know that Kerby existed. Id. at 581. However, Kerby's
name and address appeared in the Los Angeles city and telephone directories, and in each
directory, there was only one "Marion Kerby." Id. at 579. Therefore, the court concluded
that the letter "referred to [Kerby] in [a] clear and definite fashion and would be reasonably
understood by anyone who knew of her existence." Id. at 581.
1994]
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mote an individual as "another satisfied customer." 181 A seller
should inspect its records before publication to determine whether
this is really the case.181
Another way a potential defendant can avoid liability under
the "should have known" standard is by conducting a market sur-
vey. 18 9 By taking a random sample of the general public, the poten-
tial defendant could determine whether its product promotion cre-
ates the appearance of a celebrity endorsement.190 Although a
market survey may be expensive, its cost is less than the potential
legal expenses and an unfavorable damage award.9 '
Incidental appropriation will most likely occur when the plain-
tiff is a private individual, because the courts are more likely to
conclude that the defendant was totally unaware of the plaintiff's
existence. Perhaps the best example of incidental appropriation
appears in Hooker v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.1 92 T.J.
Hooker, a professional woodcarver in Illinois, claimed that the pro-
ducers of the television show "T.J. Hooker" appropriated his
name.193 The show was about a fictional policeman in California.9
The district court reasoned that a person may use another's name
187. See, e.g., Fairfield, 291 P.2d at 196 (advertisement stating that the plaintiff was a
satisfied user of the defendant's photocopier).
188. See id. at 196 (holding a copier company liable for misappropriating the plain-
tiff's name because the company circulated an advertisement that incorrectly stated that the
plaintiff was a satisfied customer); see also Brinkley v. Casablancas, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1015
(App. Div. 1981) (Kupferman, J., concurring) (suggesting that there should be a duty to
inquire as to whether the individual properly authorized the use of his identity in connec-
tion with the merchandise).
189. Cf. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1987) (stating
that market surveys are a good way to show "likelihood of confusion" in trademark cases),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 933 (1988).
190. In trademark cases, sometimes plaintiffs use market surveys to show that the de-
fendant created a "likelihood of confusion." See, e.g., Academy of Motion Picture Arts &
Sciences v. Creative House Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446, 1455-56 (9th Cir. 1991) (70% of
the white-collar professionals surveyed associated the Star Award with the Oscar); Mutual
of Omaha, 836 F.2d at 400 (random survey showed that a significant percentage believed
that Novak's post-holocaust Indian head was associated with Mutual of Omaha); Quality
Inns Int'l, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198, 205-06 (D. Md. 1988) (one third of
those surveyed associated the name "McSleep Inn" with McDonald's); Original Appalachian
Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1038 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (sur-
vey indicated that consumers associated the "Garbage Pail Kids" with the "Cabbage Patch
Kids").
191. See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 1992) (jury ver-
dict in favor of the plaintiff for $2.6 million in compensatory damages, punitive damages,
and attorneys fees), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1047 (1993); Shauna Snow, Jury Sides With
Vanna, L.A. TimSs, Jan. 24, 1994, at F2 (jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $403,000).
192. 551 F. Supp. 1060 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
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as long as he does not seek the values or benefits of that other
person's identity.195 A police drama could not be construed as
availing itself to Hooker's reputation as a woodcarver.196 Therefore,
the court held that the defendant did not appropriate the name
"T.J. Hooker.
197
IV. APPROPRIATION OF CHARACTER
On rare occasions, a potential defendant will appropriate a
role or character that is closely associated with a celebrity. In
White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.,198 Judge Alarcon, in
his dissenting opinion, addressed this situation. Judge Alarcon ar-
gued that the majority confused Vanna White with the her role on
the "Wheel of Fortune."'9 He stated that the Samsung advertise-
195. Id. at 1062 (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 805-06 (4th ed.
1971)). The applicable section of the Second Restatement of Torts states:
It is not enough that the defendant has adopted for himself a name that is the
same as that of the plaintiff, so long as he does not pass himself off as the plain-
tiff or otherwise seek to obtain for himself the values or benefits of the plaintiff's
name or identity. Unless there is such appropriation, the defendant is free to call
himself by any name that he likes. . . . Until the value of the name has in some
way been appropriated, there is no tort.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652c, comment c (1976); see also Hooker, 551 F. Supp.
at 1062.
196. Hooker, 551 F. Supp. at 1062.
197. Id. The Sixth Circuit addressed a similar problem in Carson v. Here's Johnny
Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983). The court held that the defendant ap-
propriated Johnny Carson's identity by using the phrase "Here's Johnny." Id. at 833, 835;
see also supra notes 130-36 and accompanying text. If the defendant had used a version of
Carson's legal name, such as John W. Carson, however, no violation would have occurred
because Carson's legal name is not connected with his celebrity status. Id. at 837. Thus, the
Sixth Circuit inferred that no violation would have occurred because the public does not
perceive Johnny Carson as "John W. Carson." See id.
Perhaps a more clear-cut example of the Sixth Circuit's reasoning can be found in the
following example. Suppose that an advertiser claims, without prior authorization, that Issur
Danielovitch Demsky, Joyce Penelope Frankenberg, and Kirk Burrell endorse a certain
product. No violation of these individuals' right of publicity would occur because the public
does not associate these names with actor Kirk Douglas, actress Jane Seymour, and pop
music star Hammer. See Sam Lowe, What's in a Name? Ice T, Prince and Host of Others
Dump Theirs, THE PHOENIX GAZETTE, Aug. 10, 1993, at C2 (referring to the real names of
celebrities).
198. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
199. Id. at 1404 (9th Cir. 1992) (Alarcon, J., concurring and dissenting). Separating a
role that a person plays from that person's actual identity is nearly impossible when the
person essentially portrays himself. Asking the courts to separate the two "personas" would
be like asking Orlando Cepeda to separate himself from his "role" of baseball player. See
Cepeda v. Swift and Co., 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969). Elroy Hirsch would have to separate
his actual identity from his "role" as an NFL running back. See Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson &
Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979). Also, the courts would have to separate Johnny
Carson from his "role" as a talk show host. See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets,
1994]
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ment 200 could only be associated with White's role and not her
identity.20 1 Judge Alarcon expressed his concern that under the
majority's approach, any famous person could file suit based on
any commercial advertisement depicting a character or role the
person played.20 2 Even if we could separate White from "her role,"
existing case law discredits Judge Alarcon's argument.
The courts hold a defendant liable for commercially exploiting
a celebrity's character if the character is so closely associated with
the individual that the public views the character as part of the
celebrity's identity.20 3 The first case that addressed this type of sit-
uation was Chaplin v. Amador. °4 In 1913, Charlie Chaplin created
the "Little Tramp" character, 0 5 which came to be recognized as
Chaplin himself.20 6 Around 1921, two producers hired Charles
Amador to portray the Little Tramp under the stage name
"Charles Aplin. ''20 7 The producers created, and then promoted, a
movie starring Charles Aplin in "his famous character. 2 0 8
The appellate court concluded that the defendant's fraudulent
conduct caused injury to Chaplin and deceived the public.2 9 Chap-
lin had a right to be protected against those who would injure him
by fraudulent means, or essentially, had a right to be protected
against "unfair competition in business.
210
Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983). Fortunately, no jurisdiction has adopted this line of
reasoning.
200. See supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
201. White, 971 F.2d at 1404 (Alarcon, J., concurring and dissenting).
202. Id. at 1407 (Alarcon, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Alarcon continued his
argument in great hyperbole by stating:
Under the majority's view of the law, Gene Autry could have brought an action
for damages against all other singing cowboys. Clint Eastwood would be able to
sue anyone who plays a tall, soft-spoken cowboy, unless, of course, Jimmy Stew-
art had not previously enjoined Clint Eastwood. Johnny Weismuller would have
been able to sue each actor who played the role of Tarzan. Slyvester Stallone
could sue other actors who play blue-collar boxers. Chuck Norris could sue all
karate experts who display their skills in motion pictures. Arnold Schwarzeneg-
ger could sue any body builders who are compensated for appearing in public.
Id. (Alarcon, J., concurring and dissenting).
203. See, e.g., McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 920 (3d Cir. 1994); see also infra
notes 204-28 and accompanying text.
204. 269 P. 544 (Cal. App. 1928).
205. The "Little Tramp" consisted of a man with a comic mustache, ill-fitting clothes,
a cane, and an old derby. Ralph Gardner, Tramp Twosome: A Pair of Paperbacks Honor
Charlie Chaplin's 100th Birthday, CHI. TRIB., July 3, 1989, at C3.
206. Chaplin, 269 P. at 545.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 546.
210. Id.; see also Nurmi v. Peterson, 16 Media L. Rep. 1606, 1608 (C.D. Cal. 1989)
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RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
A character and a person's actual identity may merge even if
the individual did not create the character in question.2 11 An ex-
ample of this type of merging appears in McFarland v. E & K
Corp.212 George McFarland played "Spanky" in the "Little Ras-
cals" and "Our Gang" movies of the 1930s and 1940s. i McFarland
continued to use the Spanky character for his own commercial
gain.2 1" E & K attempted, however, to operate "Spanky's Saloon"
using Spanky's name and likeness.215 E & K asserted that Spanky
was only a character and not McFarland's identity, but the court
held otherwise. 216 Because McFarland continued to portray himself
as Spanky, the court considered the character as part of his
persona.21 7
Appropriation of an individual's identity becomes easier to de-
tect when the individual is portraying himself. For example, in
Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc.,215 the district court stated that
appropriation of Laurel and Hardy's identities was much easier to
discover because they portrayed themselves on the screen rather
than portraying fictional characters.219
In most productions, however, an actor merely plays his given
role, and the role itself does not create any property rights in the
(holding that an imitation of another's character is actionable if the defendant attempted to
deceive the public into believing that the plaintiff was actually present).
211. See McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 920 (3d Cir. 1994). The Third Circuit rea-
sons that the only key factor is whether the public associates the character with "the real
life actor." Id. But see Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 433 (Cal. 1979) (Mosk, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that a protectible interest only exists in a character created by the
individual).
212. 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1496 (D. Minn. Jan. 17, 1991).
213. Id. at *1.
214. Id.
215. Id. at *1-2. The defendants also sold hats, T-shirts, and other items displaying
Spanky's name and image. Id. at *2.
216. Id. at *5.
217. Id.; see also McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 914 (3d Cir. 1994). The Third
Circuit determined that if George McFarland's executor could prove that "the name Spanky
McFarland has become so identified . . . with him as to be indistinguishable from him in
public perception," then his executor could sustain a cause of action for a violation of Mc-
Farland's right of publicity. Id.
218. 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
219. Id. at 845. Groucho Marx Prods. v. Day and Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982) contains a very similar
holding. Julius, Leo, and Adolph Marx developed the Groucho, Chico, and Harpo charac-
ters, but the three brothers essentially portrayed themselves. Id. at 491. Therefore, a musi-
cal play that contained an unauthorized exploitation of Groucho, Chico, and Harpo violated
the right of publicity of the Marx brothers and their designated heirs. Id.; see also Lugosi v.
Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 432 (Cal. 1979) (Mosk, J., concurring) (commenting that
Groucho Marx just playing Groucho cannot be exploited by others).
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individual.2 0 For example, Bela Lugosi did not have an exclusive
property right in Count Dracula because other actors have also
portrayed the role.2" Also, Sir Laurence Olivier could not have
prohibited anyone else from portraying Hamlet.
2 22
A more modern example of the difference between an actor
and his role is Michael Keaton and his portrayal of Batman. Kea-
ton's right of publicity does not extend to include Batman. Other
actors have played the role, and Batman has also been depicted as
a cartoon character with no resemblance to Keaton's image.2 2' Fur-
thermore, Keaton has played other roles aside from Batman.22 '
Thus, Keaton could not claim a right of publicity in Batman.2 25
With respect to Judge Alarcon's argument, suppose that the
"Wheel of Fortune" game show hostess is a role. However, a role
which includes a blond woman wearing designer clothes and turn-
ing block letters on a game show set conjures up the image of only
one person 2  playing that role-Vanna White.2  Furthermore,
White is essentially a one-role celebrity who is exclusively known
for her appearance on the "Wheel of Fortune.
2 28
V. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE DEAD
An unsettled issue regarding the right of publicity is the ex-
tent of the commercial interest in an individual's identity. In 1960,
220. Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 432 (Mosk, J., concurring).
221. Id. at 432 (Mosk, J., concurring).
222. Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (citing
Supreme Records v. Decca Records, 90 F. Supp. 904, 909 (SD. Cal. 1950)).
223. See generally Frank Lovece, The Big Screen Batman Might Be Too Dark a Pres-
ence For Young Kids. But There's a Kinder, Gentler Caped Crusader in These Old Movies,
TV Shows, and Cartoons on Video, BPI ENTERTAINMENT NEWS WIRE, July 14, 1992.
224. In addition to BATMAN and BATMAN RETURNS, Keaton has appeared in several
films including MR. MOM, PACIFIC HEIGHTS, and BEETLEJUICE. See National Public Radio:
President Ad Satire Teams Perot & Lucci (National Public Radio broadcast, June 28,
1992).
225. See McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 921 n.15 (3d Cir. 1994). The court reasoned
that Adam West's identity is not the same as Batman, and Johnny Weismuller is not exclu-
sively known as Tarzan. Id. Neither actor, therefore, could claim a right of publicity in their
characters because the public does not view them as being one and the same. See id.
226. Although Vanna White is the only woman the public thinks as the "Wheel of
Fortune" hostess, there was one other. Susan Stafford was the hostess from the mid-1970s
until White replaced her in 1982. Bob Greene, That's How Wheel of Fortune Spins, CH.
TaRn., Feb. 22, 1987, at Cl. Arguably, it is public perception that determines if the person's
actual identity and character merge, and not who invented the role.
227. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992) (stat-
ing that the Samsung robot's physical appearance and its placement on the "Wheel of For-
tune" set refers only to Vanna White), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
228. Id. at 1404 (Alarcon, J., concurring and dissenting).
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RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
Dean Prosser acknowledged that a person has exclusive use of
one's own identity, but he also argued, "It seems quite pointless to
dispute whether such a right is to be classified as 'property.' "229
Unfortunately, some decisions that addressed the right of publicity
followed Prosser's line of reasoning.2 30 Classification is irrelevant if
the courts view the right of publicity as strictly personal.23 How-
ever, if the courts view the right as a property interest, classifica-
tion is significant.
If the right of publicity is only actionable in tort, any possible
property interest is not assignable and extinguishes at death.2 3 2 On
the other hand, if the courts classify commercial exploitation of an
individual's persona as a property right, the right of publicity
adopts all the characteristics of property, including alienability
and descendibility. 233 Thus, if a valid property interest exists, an
individual's identity takes on a commercial nature that does not
terminate at death. 34
A. Alienability
As previously stated, the right of publicity originally devel-
oped from the tort of invasion of privacy, a personal right.236 Early
California case law held that an action for misappropriation was
purely a personal action and was not assignable to others,26 even
though the right of publicity involves an individual's right to ex-
ploit his identity for financial gain.37 In 1979, the California Su-
229. Prosser, supra note 30, at 406. Prosser's conclusion was made at a time when only
the Second Circuit recognized a person's right to transfer his right of publicity to a third
party. Id. at 406-07.
230. See, e.g., Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 825-26
(9th Cir. 1974); Haelen Lab., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 428
(Cal. 1979).
231. See Prosser, supra note 30, at 408 (stating that all four types of invasion of pri-
vacy, including misappropriation, are personal rights).
232. Id.; see also Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 428-29 (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS § 115, at 814-15 (4th ed. 1971)).
233. George M. Armstrong, Jr., The Reification of Celebrity: Persona as Property, 51
LA. L. REV. 443, 462 (1991).
234. Id. at 464-65 (citing several cases which allow the right to be assigned and survive
death).
235. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
236. See e.g., Kelly v. Johnson Publishing Co., 325 P.2d 659, 661 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958);
Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 95 P.2d 491, 495 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939).
237. The Ninth Circuit recognized that "[c]onsiderable energy and ingenuity are ex-
pended by those who have achieved celebrity value to exploit it for profit." White v. Sam-
sung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443
(1993); see also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977)
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preme Court finally recognized a person's right to assign his right
of publicity.2 3s The court asserted that a celebrity had the right to
commercially exploit his name or likeness in connection with the
sale of any product or service. 89 Moreover, an individual could
capitalize on this right by selling licenses to others.24 0
While the California courts struggled for years with whether
the right of publicity was assignable, other jurisdictions readily ac-
cepted the notion. Haelen Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing
Gum, Inc.,"4 1 the first case that specifically employed the term
"right of publicity," 42 held that the right is assignable because of
its commercial nature. 43 Most other jurisdictions also hold that
the right is a form of property2 4' that is freely assignable. 4 5 It ap-
pears, therefore, that alienability is not an issue. As the following
subsection indicates, however, the issue of descendibility remains
(analogizing the right of publicity to copyright law because in both cases, the individual
should reap the benefit of his endeavors).
238. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 428-29 (Cal. 1979) (in dicta).
239. Id. at 428 (reasoning that the right of publicity should be protected under the
laws prohibiting unfair competition).
240. Id. at 429.
241. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
242. See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 842 (6th Cir.
1983) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); McCarthy, supra note 8, at 1706; Halpern, supra note 37, at
1203.
243. Haelen, 202 F.2d at 868.
244. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170 (Baldwin 1992) (recognizing that a per-
son has a property right in his name and likeness); Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting
Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 489-94 (3d Cir.) (holding that the right of publicity is a property right),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956); Joplin Enters. v. Allen, 795 F. Supp. 349, 350 (W.D. Wash.
1992) (stating the right of publicity is a property right); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F.
Supp. 1339, 1354 (D.N.J. 1981) (stating that an individual's name and likeness are prop-
erty); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1281 (D. Minn. 1970) (recognizing a
property right in the commercial value of one's name, likeness, and public personality); Lav-
ery v. Automation Management Consultants, 360 S.E.2d 336, 342 (Va. 1987) (holding that
the Virginia Legislature created a property right in an individual's name and likeness);
Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 137 (Wis. 1979) (recognizing a commer-
cial interest in the right of publicity); Brinkley v. Casablancas, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1010
(App. Div. 1981) (recognizing the proprietary nature of the right of publicity).
245. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 598.986(1) (Michie 1991) (stating that the right
of publicity is freely transferable); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1103(a), (b) (1992) (stating
that every individual has a property right in the use of his name, photograph, or likeness
that is freely assignable); Tx. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 26.002-.004 (Vernon 1992) (recognizing
that a deceased individual has a property right in his identity that is freely transferable);
Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods., Inc.,
694 F.2d 674, 680 (11th Cir. 1983) (stating that the right of publicity is assignable during the
celebrity's life); Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 221 (2d Cir. 1978) (recog-
nizing New York cases that have labeled the right of publicity as a valid transferable right),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Cepeda v. Swift and Co., 415 F.2d 1205, 1206 (8th Cir.
1969) (holding that the right of publicity is a property right that can be sold).
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While most cases involve the right of publicity for living celeb-
rities, in some cases, the celebrity's "star power" survives the indi-
vidual's death; the most prominent example is Elvis Presley.24 6 Al-
though Presley died in 1977, his estate continues to gross over $15
million per year.2 47 Other deceased celebrities who maintain their
popularity include Marilyn Monroe,2" 8 James Dean,4 9 and civil
rights leader Malcolm X.
250
The majority of jurisdictions that have considered a deceased
individual's right of publicity have held that the right of publicity
is a descendible property interest.251 For example, the New York
district court came to this conclusion because it considered the
purely commercial nature of the right. 2 2 The Tennessee courts
took this analysis one step further by concluding that
descendibility "is consistent with a celebrity's expectation that he
is creating a valuable capital asset that will benefit his heirs and
assigns after his death."2 53 To date, only case law in New Jersey,
2 5
246. Litigation concerning Presley's right of publicity has resulted in six written opin-
ions. See generally Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Elvisly Yours, Inc., 936 F.2d 889 (6th Cir.
1991); Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980); Factors Etc.,
Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Estate
of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card
Co., 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); State ex rel. Elvis Presley Int'l Memorial Found. v.
Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). Actually, Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.
is the most prominent decision among seven written opinions concerning the same case. For
a summary of Factors I-VII, see J. Steven Bingman, Comment, A Descendible Right of
Publicity: Has the Time Come for a National Standard?, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 933, 955-61
(1990).
247. Woody Baird, 'Elvis Police' Track Impersonators, Collect Royalties For Singer's
Estate, L.A. TIMES, March 15, 1992, at A36. In 1988, Elvis was one of the top ten money-
makers among music pop stars. Robert Hilburn, Eternal Revenue, L.A. TIMES MAGAZINE,
June 11, 1989, at 10.
248. In Memory of the King and Norma Jean, ST. PETERSBURG TzMES, Aug. 2, 1992, at
60 (stating that in license fees alone, Monroe's estate earns more than $1 million annually).
249. Alan Hustak, The Legend of James Dean, THE GAZETTE (Montreal), Nov. 15,
1992, at F1 (stating that memorabilia sold by James Dean's estate has earned more than $6
million).
250. Sheila M. Poole and Jeffrey Scott, Firms Trying to Cash in on Malcolm X Sales
of Merchandise Tied to His Memory May Hit $100 Million, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 18,
1992, at A2.
251. Sixteen states have considered whether the right of publicity survives death. See
infra notes 261-321 and accompanying text. Only Arizona, Illinois, Ohio, Wisconsin, and
New York do not allow the right to survive death. See infra notes 263-66, 312-21 and ac-
companying text.
252. Price v. Hal Roach Studios, 400 F. Supp. 836, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
253. State ex rel. Elvis Presley Int'l Memorial Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 98
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Georgia, 55 and Tennessee2 5 6 allows a right of publicity for the
dead. Eight other states have enacted statutes that allow
descendibility25 7
The jurisdictions that recognize an individual's right of public-
ity after death are inconsistent as to whether the person must ex-
ercise the right during his lifetime.25 To further complicate mat-
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).
254. Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981) (interpreting New
Jersey law).
255. Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage
Prods., Inc., 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983) (after certification by the Georgia Supreme
Court).
256. Gracey v. Maddin, 769 S.W.2d 497, 500-01 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989); State ex rel.
Elvis Presley Int'l Memorial Foundation v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987);
see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1103 (1992).
257. The eight states that have enacted statutes that recognize a descendible right of
publicity are California, Texas, Florida, Kentucky, Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, and
Virginia.
California Civil Code § 990(b) states that the right of publicity is a property right that
is freely transferable before or after the individual's death. CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(b) (Deer-
ing 1992); see infra notes 267-76 and accompanying text. The Texas Property Code recog-
nizes a property right in a deceased individual's persona. However, only a surviving family
member or a person who received the right by transfer during the deceased's person's life
may exercise the right. TEx. PROP. ANN. §§ 26.001-.015 (Vernon 1992); see infra notes 294-
99 and accompanying text.
Florida law protects a person from an unauthorized commercial use of a person's name,
portrait, photograph, or other likeness. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08(1) (West 1991). In the case
of a deceased individual, however, an entity authorized to license the deceased's name and
likeness or a surviving family member must consent to any commercial exploitation. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 540.08(1)(c) (West 1991). Therefore, in Southeast Bank, N.A. v. Lawrence, 489
N.E. 2d 744 (N.Y. 1985), Southeast Bank could not sustain an action on behalf of Tennessee
Williams' estate for an alleged appropriation of Williams' name. Id. at 745 (applying the law
of decedent's domicile).
The Kentucky Legislature recognized that the right of publicity only survives death for
public figures. Ky. STAT. ANN. §§ 391.170(1), (2) (Baldwin 1992). The legislature did not,
however, define who qualifies as a public figure. See id. In separating the right from other
types of invasion of privacy, Nebraska statutory law allows the right to survive death. NEB.
REV. STAT. § 20-208 (1991).
Nevada law states that a person has a right of publicity in his name, voice, signature,
photograph, or likeness. NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 598.790 (Michie 1994). The right survives
death regardless of whether the person exploited it during his lifetime. Id. A transferee, a
surviving beneficiary, or a successor in interest may exercise a deceased person's right. NEv.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 598.986 (Michie 1992).
In Oklahoma, a surviving spouse, a personal representative, or a majority of the adult
heirs may exercise a deceased person's right of publicity. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 839.1 (1991).
Finally, in Virginia, only the surviving spouse or the next of kin may exploit a deceased's
name, portrait, or picture. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (Michie 1992).
258. For example, Georgia holds that the right does not need to be exploited during
the person's life to survive death. See Martin Luther King, Jr., Center For Social Change,
Inc. v. American Heritage Prods., Inc., 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983) (after certification by
the Georgia Supreme Court); infra notes 289-93 and accompanying text. New Jersey, how-
ever, requires that the right be exploited during one's life. See Estate of Presley v. Russen,
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ters, five states that recognize a descendible right are silent on this
issue. 59 Therefore, there is no dominant opinion as to whether the
right of publicity must be exploited prior to death for it to survive
death.
California, Tennessee, Georgia, Texas, and New York law offer
different approaches to the right of publicity for a deceased person.
The court decisions and statutory law in these states reflect the
lack of consistency in this area.
1. California
Although other jurisdictions defined the right of publicity as a
property right, 60 the California courts adhered to their original po-
sition that the right is only a personal one and is strictly grounded
in tort law. 6' In 1979, the California Supreme Court affirmed case
precedent by holding that the right of publicity was a personal
right that does not survive the individual's death.262 Arizona 2 63 Il-
513 F. Supp. 1339, 1355 and nn.9-10 (D.N.J. 1981) (interpreting New Jersey law); see infra
note 311 and accompanying text.
259. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08(1)(c) (West 1991); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170
(Baldwin 1992); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-208 (1987); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 839.1 (1991). The
Virginia Code allows the right of publicity for a deceased individual. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
40 (Michie 1992). Neither the Virginia Code nor state case law, however, address the ex-
ploitation issue. See id.; Lavery v. Automation Management Consultants, Inc., 360 S.E.2d
336 (Va. 1987).
260. See supra notes 244-45 and accompanying text.
261. Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931) (holding that the right of pri-
vacy is based in tort law alone); see also James v. Screen Gems, Inc., 344 P.2d 799, 801 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1959); Kelly v. Johnson Publishing Co., 325 P.2d 659, 661 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958).
262. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 428 (Cal. 1979); Guglielmi v. Spelling-
Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 455 (Cal. 1979).
The dicta in Lugosi has been the source of confusion for other jurisdictions attempting
to interpret California case law. For example, the Second Circuit stated that there are three
possible interpretations of Lugosi. Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day and Night Co., 689
F.2d 317, 321 (2d Cir. 1982). The first interpretation is that the heirs have no right of pub-
licity. Id. The second interpretation is that the right of publicity is descendible only if the
celebrity exploits his identity during his lifetime. Id. The third interpretation is that the
heirs could bring a cause of action only under trademark law. Id. at 322. The Second Circuit
determined that the second and third interpretations applied. Id. at 323.
The Eleventh Circuit experienced similar difficulties in interpreting Lugosi. See Acme
Circus Operating Co. v. Kuperstock, 711 F.2d 1538, 1541-44 (11th Cir. 1983). In Acme, the
court determined that the right of publicity survives death if the celebrity exercises the
right in conjunction with a specific business or product during his lifetime. Id. at 1544.
Despite the clear holding of Guglielmi, decided only two days after Lugosi, all the con-
fusion and interpretations by the two circuits occurred. In Guglielmi, the court held "that
the right of publicity protects against the unauthorized use of one's name, likeness, or per-
sonality, but that right is not descendible and expires upon death of the person so pro-
tected." Guglielmi, 603 P.2d 454, 455 (emphasis added); see also Joplin Enters. v. Allen, 795
F. Supp. 349, 351 (W.D. Wash. 1992) (citing the holding in Guglielmi).
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linois,2" Ohio,265 and Wisconsin 266 also have determined that the
right of publicity extinguishes at death.
In 1984, however, the California Legislature decided to protect
the right after death by enacting Civil Code section 990.267 Section
990(a) states that any person who uses a deceased personality's
name, signature, photograph, or likeness for advertising purposes
without prior consent is liable for any resulting injury. The legis
lature also specifically recognized that the right of publicity is a
property right that survives death, regardless of whether a person
exercised the right during his lifetime, 69 and ceases fifty years af-
ter the individual's death.27 0
263. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-3110 (1992) (stating that invasion of privacy does not
survive death). Arizona case law has not directly addressed the question of whether the
right of publicity survives the decedent. Heinz v. Frank Lloyd Wright Found., 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10688, at *43 n.4 (N.D. Ill. July 16, 1992).
But see Sinkler v. Goldsmith, 623 F. Supp. 727 (D. Ariz. 1985). The district court in-
ferred that the right of publicity may survive an individual's death if assigned to another
during the person's life. Id. at 733. The court based its decision, however, on case law in
other jurisdictions and did not directly address Arizona law. See id.
264. Maritote v. Desilu Prods., Inc., 345 F.2d 418, 420 (7th Cir. 1965) (holding that
according to Illinois law, an alleged unauthorized use of Al Capone's name was based on
invasion of privacy, and no privacy rights exist for a deceased person), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
883 (1965); see also New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 588 n.4
(2d Cir. 1989) (recognizing that a person's privacy right terminates at death), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1094 (1990).
265. Reeves v. United Artists Corp., 765 F.2d 79, 80 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that ac-
cording to Ohio law, the right of publicity is part of privacy law and lapses upon death).
266. Wisconsin statutory law states that invasion of privacy includes the commercial
use "of the name, portrait or picture of any living person, without having first obtained the
written consent." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.50(2)(b) (West 1990) (emphasis added); see also
Heinz v. Frank Lloyd Wright Found., 229 U.S.P.Q. 201 (W.D. Wis. 1986) (stating the right
of privacy does not survive death).
267. CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (Deering 1992).
268. The applicable part of § 990 states:
Any person who uses a deceased personality's name, voice, signature, photo-
graph, or likeness, in any manner. . . for purposes of advertising or selling...
without prior consent. . . shall be held liable for any damages sustained by the
person or persons injured as a result thereof.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 990(a) (Deering 1992). Compare § 990(a) with CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344(a).
See supra note 68.
269. Civil Code § 990(b) states:
The rights recognized under this section are property rights, freely transferable,
in whole or in part . . . whether the transfer occurs before the death of the
deceased personality, by the deceased personality or his or her transferees, or,
after the death of the deceased personality, by the person or persons in whom
the rights vest under this section or the transferees of that person or persons.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(b) (Deering 1992) (emphasis added).
270. CAL. CIv. CODE § 990(g) (Deering 1992). The possible origin of the 50 year limita-
tion appears in Chief Justice Bird's arguments for a descendible right of publicity. See Lu-
gosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 447 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting); Guglielmi v.
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The legislature's passage of California Civil Code section 990
did not resolve the issue of whether a descendible right of publicity
existed in California. A superior court judge ruled section 990 per
se unconstitutional," 1 but the case was later dismissed and the
opinion was never published.2 72  One district court judge also
doubted the statute's constitutionality.7 Even if Civil Code sec-
tion 990 survives constitutional attack, another outstanding prob-
lem exists. The statute strictly concerns misappropriation of name
and likeness and not the common law right of publicity. 74 It is
possible, therefore, for a person to appropriate a deceased individ-
ual's identity without violating section 990.276 For example, sup-
pose an advertiser uses Elvis Presley as part of an ad campaign. If
the advertiser uses Presley's actual name or likeness, Presley's es-
tate could sue under section 990. If the advertiser only uses an
"Elvis robot, 2 76 however, the advertiser could successfully invoke
Presley's identity without being subject to liability.
2. Tennessee
Tennessee initially followed California's common law approach
by not allowing the right of publicity to survive death.27 In Mem-
phis Development Foundation v. Factors, Etc., Inc.,2 78 the Sixth
Circuit considered the descendability issue and held that the right
of publicity was not descendible, and shifted to the public domain
after the celebrity's death.2 79 The court reasoned that making the
right inheritable "would not significantly inspire the creative en-
Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 457 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., concurring).
For the statute of limitations in other jurisdictions, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08(4)
(West 1991) (40 years after death); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170(2) (Baldwin 1984) (50
years after death); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 598.790(1) (50 years after death); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 47-25-1104(a) (1992) (10 years after death); TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.012(d)
(Vernon 1992) (50 years after death); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40(b) (Michie 1992) (20 years
after death).
271. See Bingman, supra note 246, at 965-66.
272. Id.
273. Hughes v. Plumsters, Ltd., 17 Media L. Rep. 1186, 1188 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (re-
marking that § 990 was probably unconstitutional if the defendant successfully established
his work as a parody).
274. Joplin Enters. v. Allen, 795 F. Supp. 349, 351 (W.D. Wash. 1992) (interpreting
California law).
275. Halpern, supra note 37, at 1222-23 and n.131 (speculating as to the outcome of
Motschenbacher if the action had been brought after the race car driver's death).
276. Referring to the Samsung robot, see supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
277. See infra notes 278-81 and accompanying text.
278. 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
279. Id. at 957.
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deavors of individuals in our society."280 Furthermore, the court
determined that making the right of publicity descendible would
not change an individual's expectations or increase the quality of
goods and services provided by a celebrity.
281
In 1984, the Tennessee Legislature recognized that an individ-
ual has a property interest in his name and likeness.28 2 Moreover,
the legislature stated that the right was freely assignable and de-
scendible regardless of whether the individual exploited the right
during his life.283
Later, the Tennessee state courts recognized the statutory
right in State ex rel. Elvis Presley International Foundation v.
Crowe li.28 The court in Crowell, however, reasoned that a separate
descendible right of publicity existed at common law.25 The court
attacked the Sixth's Circuit's reasoning in Memphis Development
by arguing that property includes all rights that have value and all
interests capable of being possessed to the exclusion of others.2 8 6
The court further stated that property includes intangible personal
280. Id. at 959. The Sixth Circuit also reasoned that the right of publicity was a prod-
uct of a person's fame. Id. The court held that fame was similar to reputation because "it is
an attribute from which others may benefit but not own." Id. The court then stated that the
laws of defamation were designed to protect a person's reputation, and there is no right of
action for defamation after death. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 560 (rev.
ed. 1977). Therefore, the Sixth Circuit concluded that a descendible right of publicity would
be contrary to legal precedent. Id.
Unfortunately, the Sixth Circuit confused personal fame with the commercial nature of
the right of publicity. A person may be famous and still have virtually no commercial value
in her identity. For example, Shannen Doherty became famous for her role on "Beverly
Hills, 90210." She is also known for having a terrible temper, problems in her social life, and
previous brushes with the law. See David Kronke, After Brenda, Whither Shannen? Will
'90210' Remain the Pinnacle of Doherty's Career? Not if She Reads This, L.A. Timrs, Dec.
23, 1993, at F1 (commenting on Doherty's "bad girl" image). Given Doherty's reputation, it
is highly unlikely that any company would want one of their products associated with her.
281. Memphis, 616 F.2d 959-60.
282. Section 47-25-1103(a) of the Tennessee Code states, "Every individual has a
property right in the use of his name, photograph, or likeness in any medium in any man-
ner." TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1103(a) (1992); Gracey v. Maddin, 769 S.W.2d 497, 501 n.3
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).
283. Section 47-25-1103(b) of the Tennessee Code states:
The individual rights . . . shall not expire upon the death of the individual so
protected, whether or not such rights were commercially exploited . . . during
the individual's lifetime, but shall be descendible to the executors, assigns, heirs,
or devisees of the individual so protected by this part.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1103(b) (1992); Gracey, 769 S.W.2d at 501 n.3.
284. 733 S.W.2d 89, 99 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).
285. Id. at 97-99.
286. Id. at 97 (citing Watkins v. Wyatt, 68 Tenn. 250, 255 (1987); Townsend v. Town-
send, 7 Tenn. (Peck.) 1, 17 (1821)).
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property, and it defined the right as such.28 7 The Crowell court,
therefore, held that "[i]f a celebrity's right of publicity is treated




Although California and Tennessee struggled with the
descendibility issue, Georgia case law clearly holds that the right of
publicity survives death in all cases. In Martin Luther King, Jr.,
Center For Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Products,
Inc.,289 B & S Enterprises attempted to exploit Dr. King's name
and image by developing a plastic bust as "an exclusive memorial"
to him.290 During his lifetime, Dr. King did not take commercial
advantage of his persona.291 However, the Eleventh Circuit stated
that Dr. King's right of publicity remained intact,292 and his heirs
could exercise the right to "preserve and extend his status and
memory and to prevent unauthorized exploitation thereof by
others. "293
4. Texas
The Texas Legislature recognizes a property right in a de-
ceased individual's identity.2 9 A surviving family member or a per-
287. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d at 97; see also Gracey, 769 S.W.2d at 500 (stating that the
right of publicity is a species of intangible personal property).
288. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d at 97-98 (citing Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F.
Supp. 836, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)). However, the court refused to consider whether a descendi-
ble common law right exists. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d at 99 n..
289. 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983) (after certification by the Georgia Supreme Court).
290. Id. at 675.
291. Id. at 683.
292. Id. at 682 (citing Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 846
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (stating that there cannot be a necessity to require exploitation during life
to preserve any rights for one's heirs)). The Eleventh Circuit also reasoned that Dr. King
did not exploit his identity because exploitation would have impaired his ministry. Id. at
683. The court concluded that a person who refused to exploit his image in life is entitled to
the same protection after death even more so than a person who exploited his image. Id.
293. Id. Contrary to other opinions, the Eleventh Circuit's decision appears to protect
Dr. King's personal reputation instead of any property right in his right of publicity. See id.
294. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.002 (Vernon 1992) ("An individual has a property
right in the use of the individual's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness after the
death of the individual."). The section of the property code concerning a deceased person's
right of publicity was enacted in 1987. See id. §§ 26.001-.015. However, the Texas courts
first recognized a cause of action for the unauthorized appropriation of a person's name or
likeness in Kimbrough v. Coca-Cola/USA, 521 S.W.2d 719, 721-722 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975).
See Diamond Shamrock Ref. & Mktg. Co., 844 S.W.2d 198, 205 n.4 (Tex. 1992) (Gonzalez,
J., concurring & dissenting).
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son to whom the right was transferred during the celebrity's life
may exercise the deceased's right of publicity.29 5 To exercise the
right within the first year of the celebrity's death, the owner must
register his claim. 296 After the first year, no registration is re-
quired.297 Nevertheless, if no transferee or surviving family mem-
ber exists one year after the celebrity's death, the right of publicity
terminates.2 98 Also, the Texas Legislature does not require an indi-
vidual to exercise the right of publicity during his lifetime; the
statutes specifically recognize a property right in the deceased in-
dividual's persona.29
5. New York
Originally, the New York federal courts held that the right of
publicity should be descendible.300 However, the state courts did
away with the common law right entirely, including any possible
descendible right.30 1
The descendibility issue first appeared in Price v. Hal Roach
Studios, Inc.10 2 The district court recognized that New York statu-
tory law protected a celebrity from commercial exploitation during
his life.30 The statute did not require the celebrity to exploit his
persona in order to receive protection. °30 The court, therefore, did
not require exploitation to preserve the right after death.
0 5
Later, the federal courts addressed a deceased's right of pub-
licity in Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co.30 6 and Factors Etc.,
Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.30 7 The court in both cases agreed that the
right survives death.308 The court reasoned that if the right of pub-
licity did not survive the celebrity's death, a windfall would be
granted to those who wished to exploit the celebrity's persona but
295. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.005 (Vernon 1992).
296. Id. § 26.008(b).
297. Id. § 26.009.
298. Id. § 26.010.
299. Id. § 26.002.
300. See infra notes 302-10 and accompanying text.
301. See infra notes 312-21 and accompanying text.
302. 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
303. Id. at 846 (referring to NEW YORK CIVIL RIGHTS LAW §§ 50 and 51); see supra
note 145.
304. Price, 400 F. Supp. at 846; see also Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 880
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (concluding that Cary Grant's failure to exploit his name and likeness for
commercial value did not preclude a cause of action for a violation of the right of publicity).
305. Price, 400 F. Supp. at 846.
306. 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
307. 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
308. Pro Arts, 579 F.2d at 221; Creative Card, 444 F. Supp. at 284.
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did not pay for the right while the celebrity was still alive.309 How-
ever, the court would only protect the right after death if the ce-
lebrity exploited the right during his lifetime.310 When the same
issue appeared in New Jersey, the federal district court also al-
lowed the right to survive death if first exploited during the celeb-
rity's lifetime.311
The New York Court of Appeals completely turned around the
right of publicity's status in Stephano v. News Group Publica-
tions, Inc.3 12 The Stephano court initially examined the origin of
commercial appropriation in New York.3 18 Originally, a claim for
unauthorized appropriation could only be brought under New
York Civil Rights Law and not under the common law.3 14 Later
decisions went beyond statutory law and found a right of publicity
at common law. 315 Despite an established precedent, the Stephano
309. Pro Arts, 579 F.2d at 221; Creative Card, 444 F. Supp. at 284.
310. Pro Arts, 579 F.2d at 221; Creative Card, 444 F. Supp. at 284. In both Pro Arts
and Creative Card, Elvis Presley was the deceased personality at issue. Pro Arts, 579 F.2d
at 216; Creative Card, 444 F. Supp. at 280. Presley clearly exploited his identity during his
lifetime outside the scope of his employment. Pro Arts, 579 F.2d at 216-17; Creative Card,
444 F. Supp. at 281.
Two months after the Second Circuit's decision in Pro Arts, however, the district court
stretched the grounds for proper exploitation in Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp.
426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The court ruled that because Agatha Christie licensed her name for
movies and plays based on her books, Christie sufficiently exploited her identity. Id. at 429-
30. The district court further diluted the exploitation requirement in Groucho Marx Prods.
v. Day and Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d
317 (2d Cir. 1982). The court ruled that the Marx brothers' right of publicity survived death
because they had exploited their characters of Groucho, Chico, and Harpo. Id. at 491-92.
311. Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1355 and nn. 8-10 (D.N.J. 1981)
(citing Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 222 n.11 (2d Cir. 1978), cert denied,
440 U.S. 908 (1979); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279, 284 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 446 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting)).
In a later decision, the Third Circuit concluded that the right of publicity is also a
survivable cause of action under New Jersey law. McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 917-18
(3d Cir. 1994).
312. 474 N.E.2d 580 (N.Y. 1984).
313. Id. at 583-84.
314. Id. at 583. In 1902, the Court of Appeals handed down its decision in Roberson v.
Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538 (1902). Id. A young woman sued a flour company because her
picture appeared in the company's print advertisement. Id. The court rejected her claim
because the right of privacy did not exist at common law. Id. In response, the New York
Legislature passed Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51 to provide appropriate protection. Id.
315. See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 220 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Haelen Lab., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866,
868 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723,
728-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Southeast Bank, N.A. v. Lawrence, 483 N.Y.S.2d 218, 223 (App.
Div. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 489 N.E.2d 744 (N.Y. 1985); Brinkley v. Casablancas,
438 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1011 (App. Div. 1981); Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernach, Inc., 396
N.Y.S.2d 661, 664 (App. Div. 1977).
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court held that New York statutory law encompassed the right of
publicity.3 16 Therefore, the right could not exist as an independent
common law cause of action.
31 7
New York Civil Rights Law does not allow a statutory right of
privacy for deceased individuals.318 Section 50 specifically provides
protection for only living persons. 1 9 Although the Court of Ap-
peals found that a common law right of publicity does not exist, on
two occasions the court refused to decide whether a descendible
right exists.320 A lower court, however, ruled that the right of pub-
licity does not exist in any context. '
C. The Right of Publicity Should Survive Death in All
Cases
The most logical view of the right of publicity is that it is a
form of intellectual property that survives the individual's death in
all circumstances. The right is not a personal one that protects
one's feelings or emotional well-being.32' Rather, it has a purely
commercial natures' s because "the gravamen of the harm from an
unauthorized commercial use . . . is the loss of potential financial
gain."924
316. Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 584 (N.Y. 1984).
317. Id.
318. New York Civil Rights Law § 50 states in part, "A person, firm, or corporation
that uses for advertising purposes . . . the name, portrait or picture of any living person
.. N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1992) (emphasis added).
319. Id.
320. Stephano, 474 N.E.2d at 584 n.2; Southeast Bank, N.A. v. Lawrence, 489 N.E.2d
744, 745 (N.Y. 1985).
321. James v. Delilah Films, Inc., 544 N.Y.S.2d 447, 450-51 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989); see
also Halpern, supra note 37, at 1233 (stating that in New York, the heirs or assignees of a
deceased celebrity may not maintain an action for the commercial exploitation of the celeb-
rity's name or likeness); Alan J. Hartnick, California Addresses Publicity Rights, N.Y.L.J.,
April 24, 1992, at 5 (stating that no protectible interest for a dead personality exists in New
York).
322. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d at 438-39 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., dissent-
ing); see also Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 824 (9th Cir.
1974) (reasoning that injury to one's feeling occurs in only the first three types of invasion of
privacy and not misappropriation).
323. Motschenbacher, 498 F.2d at 824 n.10 (reasoning that it would be unrealistic to
deny that a person's identity has commercial value); Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 445 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting) (recognizing the right protects an intangible proprietary interest in the commer-
cial value of one's identity); State ex rel. Elvis Presley Int'l Memorial Found. v. Crowell, 733
S.W.2d 89, 97 (Tenn. Ct. Ann. 1987) (concluding that the right of publicity is a form of
intellectual property).
324. Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 438-39 (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (footnote omitted); see also
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977) (stating that the
right of publicity focuses on the individual's right to reap the reward of his endeavors and
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Often, a celebrity expends considerable money, time, and en-
ergy to sufficiently develop public visibility that will permit an eco-
nomic return through commercial exploitation. 25 As such, protect-
ing the right of publicity after death provides an increased
economic incentive for the individual. 2 A descendible right is con-
sistent with a person's expectation that he is creating a valuable
asset to benefit his family after his death.2 7 To hold otherwise
would create a windfall for advertisers who wish to exploit a celeb-
rity's identity, but did not pay for the right while the celebrity was
alive.32 8
If the right of publicity is a freely transferable property right,
then there is no logical reason to terminate the right upon death.2 9
Since other property rights do not extinguish at death, the right of
publicity should not either.3 3 ' Some courts, however, conclude that
the right is descendible only if exploited during a person's life-
time.3 ' This means that some courts protect all celebrities during
their lifetimes, but only some celebrities after death.32 Addition-
ally, the courts protect a living celebrity even if the person chooses
not to commercially exploit his identity.333 Therefore, there is no
reason to require exploitation as a prerequisite to protecting a de-
ceased celebrity's identity."
has little to do with personal feelings).
325. Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 438 (Bird, C.J., dissenting); Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198
Cal. Rptr. 342, 350 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
326. Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 446 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
327. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d at 98.
328. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 221 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 908 (1979); Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 446 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
329. Martin Luther King, Jr., Center For Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage
Prods., Inc., 694 F.2d 647, 683 (11th Cir. 1983); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F.
Supp. 836, 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
330. For example, copyright in a work created after January 1, 1978 exists for the
duration of the author's life and for 50 years after his death. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1992).
331. See, e.g., Factors, 579 F.2d at 222; Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp 1339,
1355 and nn.9-10 (D.N.J. 1981).
332. Halpern, supra note 37, at 1235.
333. See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992) (protecting
Waits' right of publicity even though Waits refused to participate in commercial endorse-
ments), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1047 (1993); Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 880
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (concluding that Grant's failure to exploit his name and likeness for com-
mercial gain did not preclude a right of publicity claim).
334. Martin Luther King, Jr., Center For Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage
Prods., Inc., 694 F.2d 674, 683 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that a person who avoids exploita-
tion during his life should be entitled to have his image protected after death just as much,
or more, than a person who exploited his image); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F.
Supp. 836, 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (stating that "non-use" of a celebrity's identity is not a
proper ground for refusing to allow a descendible right).
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Moreover, there is no reasonable method to determine
whether a celebrity sufficiently exploited his right of publicity to
warrant a valid descendible right.335 The traditional forms of com-
mercial exploitation are: (1) exploiting one's identity outside the
scope of one's profession; and (2) making an inter vivos transfer of
one's publicity rights.336 The commercial exploitation requirement,
however, is ambiguous and can be stretched to fit any given
situation.
3 7
Furthermore, several courts, including the United States Su-
preme Court, reason that the right of publicity is a form of intel-
lectual property analogous to copyright law. 83 8 Both copyright and
the right of publicity reward the time and effort invested in creat-
ing a property interest and the public benefit derived from it.339
Copyright gives authors the exclusive rights in their creative works
while the right of publicity gives individuals exclusive rights in the
commercial value of their personas. 
4
0
Copyright law protects authors who create original works in a
335. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 447 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
336. Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Note, An
Assessment of the Commercial Exploitation Requirement as a Limit on the Right of Pub-
licity, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1703, 1709 (1983).
337. See, e.g., King, 694 F.2d at 676 (plaintiff argued that Dr. King exploited his iden-
tity by receiving honorariums); Hicks, 464 F. Supp. at 429-30 (concluding that Agatha
Christie fulfilled the exploitation requirement by licensing her name in connection with
movies and plays about her books); Groucho Marx Prods. v. Day and Night Co., 523 F.
Supp. 485, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that the Marx brothers' exploitation of their char-
acters was sufficient to fulfill the exploitation requirement), rev'd on other grounds, 689
F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
338. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977)
(analogizing the right of publicity to patent and copyright law); Baltimore Orioles v. Major
League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 677-79 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that copyright
law preempts the right of publicity with respect to baseball players' performance rights),
cert. denied, 489 U.S. 941 (1987); Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 441 (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (following
the Supreme Court's reasoning in Zacchini); Apple Corps Ltd. v. Leber, 12 Media L. Rep.
2280, 2282 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1986) (same); see also Pamela Samuelson, Reviving Zacchini:
Analyzing First Amendment Defenses in Right of Publicity and Copyright Cases, 57 TUL.
L. REV. 836, 849-54 (1983) (comparing the economic interests of copyright and right of pub-
licity); David E. Shipley, Publicity Never Dies; It Just Fades Away: The Right of Publicity
and Federal Preemption, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 673, 682-84 (1981).
339. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573; Samuelson, supra note 338, at 849.
340. Marc J. Apfelbaum, Note, Copyright and the Right of Publicity, One Pea in Two
Pods?, 71 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1572 (1983).
The Supreme Court reasons, however, that the "primary objective of copyright is . . .
'[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.'" Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (quoting U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8). Nevertheless,
this statement is not inconsistent with the Court's previous opinion that authors deserve the
economic benefit of their labor. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573. Otherwise, there would be no
cause of action for wrongfully exploiting another's original work.
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tangible medium of expression. 41 Copyright protection endures for
the duration of the author's life and for fifty years after his
death.3 42 Copyright protection exists regardless of whether the au-
thor exploited the work.
3 4
1
Likewise, the right of publicity exists in a person's identity be-
cause it contains commercial value.34' The courts protect an indi-
vidual's right of publicity regardless of whether the person chooses
to exploit the right.3 45 Thus, because of the similarities between
the two forms of property, the courts should not impose an ex-
ploitation requirement on the right of publicity either.34 For the
foregoing reasons, therefore, a descendible right of publicity with
no conditions would be the most logical and reasonable policy.
VI. DEFENSES
According to the Supreme Court, "[a]t the heart of the First
Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of
the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest
and concern."347 The courts protect the press and other forms of
mass communication from liability under the First Amendment.
3 "
341. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1992).
342. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1992).
343. Under the 1909 Copyright Act, federal copyright protection began at the moment
of publication and not at the time of creation. See CRAIG JOYCE, ET. AL, COPYRIGHT LAW 11
(2d ed. 1991). Under 1976 Copyright Act, however, protection extends when the work is
created. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1992).
344. See supra notes 241-45 and accompanying text.
345. See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992) (protecting
Waits's right of publicity even though he refuses to participate in commercial endorse-
ments), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1407 (1993); Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (protecting Grant's likeness even though he did not commercially exploit
it).
346. Some courts and commentators reason that the right of publicity is analogous to
trademark law. See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399-1401 (9th
Cir. 1992) (holding that as a matter of law, White properly stated a claim under the Lanham
Act), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993); McFarland v. E & K Corp., 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1496, at *6 (D. Minn. Jan. 17, 1991) (concluding that the Lanham Act protects a
wide variety of deceptive practices including unauthorized use of a celebrity's identity); Al-
len v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (reasoning that for an
appropriation of Allen's likeness, the Lanham Act provides a more appropriate remedy);
Halpern, supra note 37, at 1240-42 (arguing for the expansion of the Lanham Act to cover
right of publicity claims). The Supreme Court, however, concluded that the right of public-
ity is similar to only copyright and patent law. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcast-
ing Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977).
347. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S.
374, 382 (1967).
348. The Supreme Court stated that the First Amendment was a "constitutional safe-
guard that " 'was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about
political and social changes desired by the people.'" New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
19941
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The rights granted, however, are not absolute; a celebrity may still
protect himself from unauthorized commercial appropriation.3 9
This section examines the defenses of "newsworthiness" and par-
ody with respect to the right of publicity.
A. Newsworthiness
The courts insulate the media from liability as long as the me-
dia publishes or broadcasts matters that are "newsworthy" or "in
the public interest. 35 0 When the media reports or comments on
matters concerning celebrities, the First Amendment provides
broad discretion. 5' The courts do not hold the media liable for
defamation of a well-known individual unless the celebrity can
prove "actual malice. 3 52 The courts do not allow a cause of action
254, 269 (1964) (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
See also CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 990(n), 3344(d) (Deering 1992) (exceptions to misappropria-
tion of name or likeness for news and entertainment); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08(3)(a) (West
1991) (exception to misappropriation for news reports); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 598.790(2)(c) (Michie 1994) (exempting written consent when using a person's identity in
connection with a news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or publication); Ann-Margret v.
High Society Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (quoting Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 382 (1967) (recognizing the narrow interpretation given to New York
Civil Rights Law § 51 to allow for the free dissemination of newsworthy events and matters
of public interest)).
349. The First Amendment does not immunize the media from liability when the me-
dia infringes on the celebrity's right to commercially exploit his identity. See Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575 (1977); Eastwood v. Superior Court,
198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 350 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
350. Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 349; see also Peter J. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin,
Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1602
(1979).
The Fifth Circuit defines "newsworthiness" and "of the public interest" in the following
manner:
This broad constitutional privilege recognizes two . distinct privileges. First is
the privilege to publish or broadcast facts, events, and information relating to
public figures. Second is the privilege to publish or broadcast news or other mat-
ters of public interest . . . . [T]he first privilege focuses on the person assuming
a role of special prominence . . . or . . . thrusting himself to the forefront of a
particular controversy. . .. [T]he second privilege . . . is not merely limited to
the dissemination of news . . . . Rather, the privilege extends to information
concerning interesting phases of human activity . ...
Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 1980) (citations omitted).
351. In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), the Court reasoned that in matters
concerning public figures, the First Amendment guarantees "'the free dissemination of
thoughts, ideas, newsworthy events, and matters of public interest.' " Id. at 382 (quoting
Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 221 N.E.2d 543, 544-45 (N.Y. 1966)).
352. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 160 (1967); New York Times v. Sul-
livan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). The Court defines "actual malice" as the publishing of a
false statement knowing that the statement was false or with a reckless disregard for the
truth. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80. Originally, the actual malice standard only ap-
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against a media defendant if the media's comments are only state-
ments of opinion. 53 Published opinions that are outrageous and
offensive to the general public are also protected." 4 Furthermore,
the courts even protect undesired or embarrassing publicity as long
as the reporting of the incident is in the public interest.3 55
The courts liberally interpret what is considered newsworthy
or in the public interest. The scope of newsworthiness includes
matters of "entertainment and amusement, concerning interesting
phases of human activity in general."3 56 First Amendment protec-
tion, therefore, extends to wide varieties of expression including
books, 357 magazines, 58 television,3 59 and motion pictures.3 60 Protec-
plied to public officials. Id. at 279. Later, the Court expanded the standard to include public
figures. Curtis, 388 U.S. at 162; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 335 (1974). When
the alleged defamation concerns a private individual involved in a public interest, however,
the plaintiff needs only to prove that the media defendant acted negligently. Gertz, 418 U.S.
at 347-48.
353. The Supreme Court stated, "The First Amendment recognizes no such thing as a
'false' idea." Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339.
354. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 55 (reasoning that society finding speech offensive is not a
sufficient reason to suppress it). The First Circuit noted that First Amendment protection
does not warrant an inquiry into the reader, listener, or viewer's level of offensiveness. L.L.
Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishing, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1987) (citing United States v.
Guarino, 729 F.2d 864, 867 (1st Cir. 1984) (en banc)), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1013 (1987).
Even sexually explicit but nonobscene materials are entitled to the same protection as other
expression forms. Id. at 34 (citing Fantasy Book Shop, Inc. v. City of Boston, 652 F.2d 1115,
1126 (1st Cir. 1981)).
355. See, e.g., Ann-Margret v. High Society Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401, 405
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (concluding that Ann-Margret appearing nude in a movie was in the public
interest); Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 350 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (stating
that Clint Eastwood's personal life was a legitimate public interest). Cf. Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1974) (holding that no invasion of privacy occurred when the
defendant published a deceased rape victim's name because the name appeared in the pub-
lic record).
According to one California appellate court, an individual can remain in the public in-
terest for an extended period of time even if the person intentionally avoids public atten-
tion. See Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). Mickey
Dora was a famous Malibu surfer during the 1950s. Id. at 791. In 1987, Frontline Video
made a documentary about several famous surfers, including Dora. Id. Dora claimed that
Frontline appropriated his identity without permission. Id. Even though Dora had not been
a highly visible person for about 30 years, and he intentionally avoided "the limelight," the
appellate court determined that Dora was still a limited public figure. Id. at 791-94. Thus,
the public interest rests with what the public deems to be interesting and is not dependent
on the actions or wishes of the individual. See id. at 792 (citing Carlisle v. Fawcett Publica-
tions, Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 405, 414 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962)).
356. Ann-Margret, 498 F. Supp. at 405 (citing Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 299
N.Y.S.2d 501, 506 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968)); see also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977) (holding that entertainment, as well as news, enjoys First
Amendment protection).
357. See, e.g., Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (novel
about Agatha Christie); Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 427 N.Y.S.2d 828 (App. Div. 1980)
1994]
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tion extends whether the medium portrays an accurate account, 861
a work of fiction e6 2 or a combination of both.36 3 Also, the mere fact
that a publication is sold for profit does not strip away First
Amendment protection." 4
While the First Amendment grants the media broad discretion
in news reporting and other matters of public interest, the courts
do not immunize the media when they infringe upon a person's
right of publicity."6 In a First Amendment analysis, courts balance
society's interest in the protection of free speech and expression
against the rights of the individual.6 6 The balance tips in favor of
(biography of Marilyn Monroe).
358. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); Leidholdt v. L.F.P.
Inc., 860 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1080 (1989); Ann-Margret v. High
Society Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
359. See, e.g., Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 457 (Cal. 1979)
(Bird, C.J., concurring) (fictional TV movie about the life of Rudolph Valentino); Cohn v.
National Broadcasting Co., 3 Media L. Rep. 1999 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (fictionalized televi-
sion account of the McCarthy period).
360. See, e.g., Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (9th Cir. 1989) (fictional movie refer-
ring to Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (fictional movie about Agatha Christie).
361. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (news
broadcast); Cher v. Forum Int'l Ltd., 692 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1982) (interviews published in
magazines), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1120 (1983); Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 427
N.Y.S.2d 828 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (biographies).
362. See, e.g., Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (9th Cir. 1989) (fictional movie); Hicks
v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (fictional movie and book); Gug-
lielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454 (Cal. 1979) (fictional TV movie).
363. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (fictionalized account of a family
held hostage); Wojtowicz v. Delacorte Press, 43 N.Y.2d 858 (N.Y. 1978) (fictionalized ac-
count of a Brooklyn bank robbery).
364. Time, 385 U.S. at 396-97 (holding that the First Amendment applies to newspa-
per publications and motion pictures and not just to mediums that do not directly charge
their patrons). Accord Leidholdt v. L.F.P. Inc., 860 F.2d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. de-
nied, 489 U.S. 1080 (1989); New Kids on the Block v. News Publishing Am., Inc., 745 F.
Supp. 1540, 1546 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd on other grounds, 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992); Ann-
Margret v. High Society Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
Also, the opinion that news broadcasts are "free" is misguided. Network news divisions
are always attempting to increase their Nielson ratings in an effort to attract more advertis-
ing revenue. See, e.g., Brendon Murphy, The Week in Business, UPI, June 15, 1990, at
Financial Section; John McCosh, Atlanta's Gladiator Journalism, ATLANTA Bus. CHRON.,
July 6, 1987, at 1A. The only true difference between the news and other publication forms
is whether the consumer pays directly for the information or indirectly through the
purchase price of advertised products.
365. Felcher & Rubin, supra note 342, at 1606; see also Briscoe v. Reader's Digest
Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34, 42 (Cal. 1971); Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 350 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1983) (reasoning that the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment do not re-
quire a total abrogation of the right of privacy).
366. Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (generally
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the individual when the speech in question commercially exploits
the individual's identity.
367
The Supreme Court addressed the conflict between the First
Amendment and the right of publicity in Zacchini v. Scripps-How-
ard Broadcasting Co. 369 Without Zacchini's consent, a local televi-
sion station broadcasted his entire human cannonball act, which
lasted only fifteen seconds. 69 Zacchini claimed the broadcast un-
lawfully appropriated his personal property.3 70 The Court ruled
that states have an interest in protecting a person's proprietary in-
terest to encourage entertainment. 71 The Court reasoned that the
First Amendment does not immunize the media because the
broadcast posed a substantial threat to Zacchini's economic liveli-
hood. 72 If the television station had reported only about the event,
however, First Amendment protection would have applied because
entertainment is considered important news.
37 3
The problem with Zacchini is that the case had a very narrow
holding.3 74 The Court ruled only that appropriation occurred be-
cause the defendant commercially exploited the performer's "en-
tire act. 3s75 However, the lower courts generally implement a less
restrictive approach, not providing First Amendment protection
when the media directly appropriates 76 the celebrity's identity for
367. Felcher & Rubin, supra note 350, at 1606. The balance between the First Amend-
ment and the right of publicity is similar to the application of the fair use doctrine in copy-
right law. For an analysis of the right of publicity and copyright in a fair use context, see
generally Pamela Samuelson, Reviving Zacchini: Analyzing First Amendment Defenses in
Right of Publicity and Copyright Cases, 57 TUL. L. REV. 836 (1983).
368. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
369. Id. at 563-64.
370. Id. at 564.
371. Id. at 573. The Court discussed the right of publicity in relation to invasion of
privacy. Id. at 571-72. The Court distinguished the right by asserting that "the State's inter-
est in permitting a 'right of publicity' is in protecting the proprietary interest of the individ-
ual in his act in part to encourage such entertainment." Id. at 573.
372. 372. Id. at 575; see also Eastwood V. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 350 (Ct.
App. 1983) (stating that absolute protection of the press would sacrifice Eastwood's compet-
ing interest in his right of publicity).
373. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977); see also
Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 299 N.Y.S.2d 501, 506 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968) (comment-
ing that the media is exempt from liability when using a person's name or picture in connec-
tion with a newsworthy event).
374. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 579 (Powell, J., dissenting).
375. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Samuelson, supra note 338, at 857-58 and
n.81 (stating concerns regarding Zacchini's narrow holding).
376. Incidental use of a celebrity's identity in an advertisement or promotion does not
violate the right of publicity. See, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News Publishing Am., Inc.,
745 F. Supp. 1540, 1546 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (using a 900 telephone number to conduct a poll
about the New Kids on the Block was not a violation because the revenue generated was
1994]
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its own commercial gain."' Cher v. Forum Int'l Ltd.,s~8 Ali v.
Playgirl, Inc.,'3 1 and Ann-Margret v. High Society Magazine,
Inc."' are examples of lower courts' approaches.
In Cher, Cher381 gave a taped interview to Fred Robbins, a ra-
dio talk show host, with the understanding that US magazine
would publish the interview, but Cher later asked that the story be
killed and paid a "kill" fee."8 2 Robbins sold the story to the Star, a
weekly tabloid, and to Forum magazine, and both magazines pub-
lished the interview.
38 3
The Ninth Circuit ruled that the First Amendment protected
the Star's publication of the story because the statements attrib-
uted to Cher were not false or published with a reckless disregard
for the truth.384 Even the Star's claim that Cher gave an exclusive
interview did not meet the knowing or reckless falsity
requirement.
8 5
When Forum published the same interview, however, an ac-
companying subscription "tear out" stated, "There are certain
things that Cher won't tell People and will never te]l US. She tells
Forum."' The Ninth Circuit ruled that Forum's solicitation
falsely created the appearance of an implied endorsement by
only incidental to news gathering), aff'd on other grounds, 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992);
Namath v. Sports Illustrated, 371 N.Y.S.2d 10 (App. Div. 1975) (using Joe Namath's like-
ness as part of a subscription request was not a violation because the picture only showed
the magazine's quality and content), aff'd, 352 N.E.2d 584 (N.Y. 1976).
377. Samuelson, supra note 338, at 876-78. Cf. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581
F.2d 751, 759 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that the First Amendment does not protect the direct
appropriation of Disney cartoon characters in an adult "counter culture" comic book), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979).
378. 692 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1120 (1983).
379. 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
380. 498 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
381. Cher originally became famous as Sonny Bono's partner on the Sonny and Cher
Comedy Hour, which launched her singing career. Wayne Robbins, Cher - Honest and Full
of Herself, NEWSDAY, Oct. 29, 1992, § II at 66. Cher also won an Academy Award for her
performance in the film MOONSTRUCK. Id. Additionally, she appeared in SILKWOOD, MASK,
and THE WITCHES OF EASTWICK. Id.
382. Cher, 692 F.2d at 636.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 637-38. Apparently, the Ninth Circuit did not believe that the appearance
of Cher giving an interview to Star constituted defamation under the actual malice standard
set out in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). See Cher, 692 F.2d at
637-38. The court did not discuss any right of publicity action against Star. Arguably, the
mere fact that the magazine gave the appearance of an exclusive interview did not amount
to a commercial endorsement. See id. at 639.
385. Id. at 638.
386. Id. Forum's solicitation also said, "So join Cher and Forum's hundreds of
thousands of other adventurous readers today." Id. at 639.
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Cher.387 The unauthorized use of Cher's name and likeness, there-
fore, was an actionable misappropriation that was not protected by
the First Amendment.
388
In Ali v. Playgirl, Inc.,38 9 Playgirl magazine depicted a por-
trait of a nude black man with a striking resemblance to Muham-
med Ali.390 The district court determined that because the portrait
contained no informational or newsworthy dimension,3 91 Playgirl
wrongfully appropriated Ali's likeness. 2
Contrary to Ali, the court protected the publication at issue in
Ann-Margret v. High Society Magazine, Inc.393 During a scene in
the 1978 motion picture "Magic," Ann-Margret 94 appeared nude
from the waist up. 9' A still photo, which was lifted from the par-
ticular scene, appeared in the defendant's magazine. 96 According
to the district court, Ann-Margret was a public figure, and because
she chose to appear half nude in a movie, the matter was in the
public interest.9 7 Therefore, the magazine was entitled to constitu-
tional protection because the picture constituted a newsworthy
event.398
387. Id. at 638-39.
388. Id. at 639.
389. 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
390. Id. at 725. For the district court's opinion regarding the violation of Ali's right of
publicity, see supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
391. Ali, 447 F. Supp. at 726.
392. Id. at 729.
393. 498 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
394. Over the past 30 years, Ann-Margret has appeared in nearly 50 motion picture
and television films. Blake Green, Ann-Margret Keeps 'em Guessing, NEWSDAY, Oct. 21,
1991, Fanfare, at 6. Incidentally, one of her more famous movies was CARNAL KNOWLEDGE.
Id. Ann-Margret appeared nude in a scene in this film as well. The controversial scene re-
sulted in the Supreme Court defining the limits of constitutionally protected pornography.
See generally Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
395. Ann-Margret, 498 F. Supp. at 403.
396. Id. at 404.
397. Id. at 404-05. The district court also noted that Ann-Margret chose to appear
partially nude in a movie. Id. at 405. The court concluded that when a person consents to
being viewed in a certain manner in one type of public performance, the person cannot
object to a subsequent faithful reproduction. Id.
398. Id. at 405. But see Davis v. High Society Magazine, Inc., 457 N.Y.S.2d 308 (App.
Div. 1982). One issue of Celebrity Skin magazine featured a photograph of two topless
women boxing. Id. at 311. The caption next to the picture incorrectly referred to the plain-
tiff as one of the boxers. Id. The court ruled that the defendant did not violate Davis' right
of publicity because the First Amendment protects newsworthy events including those with
little informational value. Id. at 313, 315. However, the court allowed Davis to proceed with
a cause of action for defamation. Id. at 316.
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B. Parody
Parody is a "composition in which the characteristic turns of
thought and phrase of an author are mimicked to appear ridicu-
lous, especially applying them to ludicrously inappropriate sub-
jects."3'9 Parody is also an expressive activity that receives First
Amendment protection4 0 0 because such works "constitute an im-
portant and creative activity that our society values very
highly."'40' Parody receives less protection in a commercial setting
because it can be perceived as an endorsement.402 Also, the courts
protect only works that are clear parodies and not mere imita-
tions. 4 s A parody uses another's attributes as part of a larger pres-
entation in which the parodist contributes a considerable amount
of content.40 ' Imitation is only an attempt to duplicate another
person's characteristics.4 0 5 Therefore, parody is constitutionally
protected speech while imitation is not.
40 6
One form of parody occurs when the celebrity's performance is
the basis for artistic interpretation. The courts protect another's
parody if the entire work is more than just an imitation of the ce-
399. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishing, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1013 (1987). Another court defined
parody as "'a literary or musical work in which the style of an author or work is closely
imitated for comic effect or in ridicule.," Eveready Battery Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 765 F.
Supp. 440, 446 n.12 (N.D. I1 1991) (quoting WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
857 (1984)).
400. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 n.3 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993); L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 33; see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977) (reasoning that the First Amendment fully protects expres-
sions on philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, and ethical matters).
401. Felcher & Rubin, supra note 350, at 1598 (listing parody among other types of
artistic works that receive First Amendment protection).
402. L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 32 n.3; see also Groucho Marx Prods. v. Day and Night
Co., 523 F. Supp. 485, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (stating that the First Amendment does not
protect the defendant's use of a celebrity's identity if the use is largely for commercial pur-
poses), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
403. See Groucho Marx, 523 F. Supp. at 493. The district court stated that parody,
burlesque, satire, and critical review may be immune from the right of publicity because of
their contributions as entertainment and as a literary form. Id. A mere imitator who uses
another's work solely for commercial gain, however, will not be entitled to any protection.
Id.
See also Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1356 (D.N.J. 1981). The court
stated that if a portrayal contributes to the public debate of social or political issues or
contributes to society's cultural enrichment, the portrayal will be immune from liability. Id.
If the portrayal is only a means of commercial exploitation, however, the courts will not
grant immunity. Id.









For example, in Groucho Marx Productions v. Day and Night
Co.,40 8 the defendants claimed that their musical play, "A Day in
Hollywood/A Night in the Ukraine," was only a parody of the
Marx brothers,'09 but the play imitated their humor and style only
using different lines.410 The court stated that a parody may conjure
up the original only if something new is contributed for humorous
effect or commentary. 41' Because the play lacked any creative com-
ponent, it was an unauthorized appropriation of the Marx broth-
ers' identities.
4" 2
In Joplin Enterprises v. Allen,41s however, the district court
determined that the play Janis did not infringe on Janis Joplin's"'
4
rights.4 15 Act I of Janis was a fictional portrayal of a day in Jop-
lin's life, and Act II simulated a concert performance by Joplin. 416
The plaintiffs claimed that Act II violated Joplin's right of public-
ity.' 7 The district court, however, examined the play as a whole.4 8
407. See infra notes 408-12 and accompanying text.
408. 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir.
1982).
409. Id. at 492.
410. Id. at 493.
411. Id. at 493 n.9 (quoting Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 623
F.2d 252, 253 n.1 (2d Cir. 1980)).
412. Groucho Marx, 523 F. Supp. at 492. Cases similar to Groucho Marx appear in
New Jersey and California. In Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981),
Bob Russen produced THE BIG EL SHOW, a stage performance that featured an Elvis imper-
sonator. Id. at 1358. The court held that the stage show only imitated Presley's perform-
ance, and therefore, it commercially exploited Presley's likeness "without contributing any-
thing of substantial value to society." Id. at 1359.
In California, the parody issue arose in Apple Corps Ltd. v. Leber, 12 Media L. Rep.
2280 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1986) (interpreting New York law). BEATLEMANIA was a stage perform-
ance that imitated the Beatles' look and sound as closely as possible. Id. at 2281. The supe-
rior court stated that the primary purpose of the show was the commercial exploitation of
the Beatles' persona, goodwill, and popularity. Id. at 2282. Therefore, the show appropriated
the Beatles' identity. Id.
413. 795 F. Supp. 349 (W.D. Wash. 1992) (applying California law through choice of
law rules).
414. Joplin was a 1960s blues singer whose songs included Me and Bobby McGee and
(Take a) Piece of My Heart. John Balzar, Who Owns Janis Joplin?; Playwright, Heirs
Fight For a Piece of a '60s Icon, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1991, at Fl. In 1970, Joplin died of a
heroin overdose at age 27. Id.
415. Joplin, 795 F. Supp. at 352.
416. Id. at 350.
417. Id. at 350-51.
418. Id. at 351. The court reasoned that California Civil Code § 990 contemplated
examining the use of the celebrity's persona in the total context in which it appears. Id. The
Civil Code specifically exempts the use of a deceased person's name, voice, signature, photo-




Left: Not For Just Another Pretty Face: Providing Full Protection Under
Published by Institutional Repository, 1994
ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW
As a result, the court determined that Janis was a theatrical pro-
duction, and no violation of Joplin's right of publicity occurred.41
VII. CONCLUSION
Most courts and commentators agree that the right of public-
ity is a form of intellectual property,420 but there is little agree-
ment as to the right's scope of protection. Some jurisdictions ex-
tend protection beyond name and likeness to include other traits
such as a person's voice, 42 1 signature,' 2 or stage performance.42 3 A
few jurisdictions extend protection to a celebrity's identity as a
whole. 4
Recognizing a right of publicity in one's identity is the most
certain way of protecting celebrities from unauthorized commercial
exploitation.2 Courts should consider, as the determining factor,
-whether a potential defendant created the appearance of a celeb-
rity endorsement.426 The only true requirement for finding a viola-
tion of the right of publicity is for the defendant to invoke the
celebrity's identity without permission. 27 This includes wrongfully
appropriating a character so closely associated with the celebrity
that the public views the character as part of the person's actual
419. Joplin, 795 F. Supp. at 351. After the court's ruling, the plaintiffs argued that the
decision opened the door for anyone to imitate a celebrity's concert performance so long as
the defendant included some extra material. Plaintiffs Respond to Court Ruling in Joplin v.
Allen, PR NEwswniE, Dec. 17, 1991. Arguably, a play in which half of the performance is
pure imitation may be the limit for allowing the imitation of a celebrity's performance with-
out infringing on the right of publicity.
420. Gretchen A. Pemberton, The Parodist's Claim to Fame: A Parody Exception to
the Right of Publicity, 27 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 97, 113 n.56 (1993) (citing J. THOMAS McCAR-
THY, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY §§ 10-7 to 10-8 (1993)).
421. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (Deering 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 598.790 (Michie 1994); TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.011 (Vernon 1992) (providing protec-
tion after death).
422. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344(a); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 598.790 (Michie
1994); TEx. PROP. CODE. ANN. § 26.011 (Vernon 1992) (providing protection after death).
423. See, e.g., Groucho Marx Prods. v. Day and Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513
F. Supp. 1399 (D.N.J. 1981); Apple Corps Ltd. v. Leber, 12 Media L. Rep. 2280 (Cal. Super.
Ct. 1986).
424. See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1513 (1992); Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th
Cir. 1983); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1970); Hirsch v. S.C.
Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 137 (Wis. 1979).
425. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
426. See supra notes 150-51, 156-57, 164, 168-72 and accompanying text.
427. White, 971 F.2d at 1398; Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d
831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983).
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identity.42 If the courts fail to protect all aspects of a celebrity's
identity, an advertiser could still find a way to create the appear-
ance of a celebrity endorsement and not be held liable. 29
In determining whether a right of publicity violation occurred,
the courts should examine the totality of the alleged appropriation.
The totality approach is the best method for determining whether
the defendant deceived the public into believing that the celebrity
in question endorses the defendant's product. 4 ° The courts should
also consider the defendant's state of mind; liability should exist
when the defendant knew or should have known that it created the
appearance of a celebrity endorsement.3 1
Because the right of publicity protects individuals from unau-
thorized commercial exploitation, 32 it is clearly a property right. 33
Most jurisdictions conclude that the right of publicity is freely
alienable,'3 ' and thus, there is no logical reason to impose restric-
tions on the right after the individual's death.438 A descendible
right is consistent with a person's expectations regarding other
forms of property. 43 Furthermore, if the right of publicity is fully
protected during a person's life, the courts should not impose arti-
ficial restrictions after the person's death. 37
Even under the proposed expanded form of property, the right
of publicity is not without restrictions. Because celebrities are pub-
lic figures, they are subjects of great public interest. 8" The First
Amendment extends protection to a wide variety of expression
4
39
including those forms that report, comment, and criticize on mat-
ters concerning celebrities. 440 The First Amendment does not, how-
ever, immunize a media defendant when the defendant creates the
428. See supra notes 203-19 and accompanying text.
429. White, 971 F.2d at 1398 (stating that protecting against nine different methods of
infringement only encourages someone to come up with a tenth method).
430. See supra notes 165-77 and accompanying text.
431. See supra notes 179-97 and accompanying text.
432. See, e.g., Haelen Lab., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d
Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
433. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
434. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
435. See supra notes 322-46 and accompanying text.
436. State ex rel. Elvis Presley Int'l Memorial Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 98
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).
437. See supra notes 329-34 and accompanying text.
438. See, e.g., Ann-Margret v. High Society Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401, 415
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Davis v. High Society Magazine, Inc., 457 N.Y.S.2d 308, 315-16 (App. Div.
1982).
439. See supra notes 357-64 and accompanying text.
440. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 382 (1967).
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appearance of a celebrity endorsement.4 4 ' A defendant's commen-
tary on a celebrity may also take the form of a parody, but the
courts will not protect a parody performance if the performance is
only an imitation. 2
Given the foregoing analysis, the right of publicity should pro-
tect a celebrity's complete identity and not just certain aspects of
identity. The right should also protect both living and deceased
celebrities. If the courts fully adopt these two concepts, a potential
defendant who attempts to commercially appropriate a celebrity's
identity will be gambling against the odds. The defendant's unau-
thorized appropriation would result in financial losses instead of
the expected gains from the illusion of a celebrity endorsement.
441. See supra notes 365-67, 381-98 and accompanying text.
442. See supra notes 407-19 and accompanying text.
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